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FOREWORD
The North Caucasus has been a source of instability
for Russia ever since the Russian Empire brought the
region under its control in the course of the late-18th
and the first half of the 19th centuries. General Alexei
Yermolov, a top Russian commander in North Caucasus, used inhumanely harsh methods to conquer the
region and retain it under the Romanov crown’s control. Hundreds of thousands were ethnically cleansed,
and many civilians murdered.
In the Russian Civil War (1918-21), which took place
right after World War I, the North Caucasus became a
victim of both the tsarist White Army and the communist Red Army, who plundered the region and refused
to give its peoples the rights they hoped to regain after
the war was over. A little over 2 decades after that, the
North Caucasus nations faced merciless deportations
as a result of imaginary crimes they allegedly committed against the Soviet Union during World War
II. Hundreds of thousands of Chechens and Ingush
were ethnically cleansed and forcibly relocated to Kazakhstan’s frozen steppes, Central Asian deserts, and
elsewhere. In the 1990s, Chechen demands for independence led to two devastating wars, which resulted
in tens of thousands of casualties, destroyed cities and
villages, and hundreds of thousands of refugees.
Today, the region reminds one of a simmering
cauldron, and the issues that caused so much violence
in the past have not been resolved. Russia has basically
granted Chechnya a de facto independence, complemented by huge federal monetary subsidies, in order
to prevent it from trying to claim de jure independence
again. This strategy has so far been successful. However, the fragile stability in Chechnya is now based
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on the depth of the Kremlin’s pockets; the whims of
the current Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov; and on
appeasing the local population with federal money.
How long this bargain between the Kremlin, Kadyrov,
and the Chechen people will last remains to be seen.
Ethnic Russians, tired of the cronyism and rigidity
of their public institutions, watch with jealousy how
much money the North Caucasian “aliens” keep getting from the federal budget. The nationalists march
under the slogan “Enough feeding the Caucasus,”
creating a deep fissure between citizens of the same
country. Meanwhile, the nations of the North Caucasus lack a system that would allow people to freely
pursue their personal aspirations. Due to poverty,
high unemployment, and higher birth rates in the
North Caucasus than in the rest of Russia, the problem
is likely to get worse.
If the situation gets out of control, the consequences are hard to predict. The North Caucasus shares borders with similarly unstable South Caucasus, and has
close ties to the Middle East and Afghanistan, with
ramifications both in terms of terrorism and drug trafficking. Therefore, it is a shared interest of the United States, Europe, and Russia to make sure that the
North Caucasus remains stable and does not become
a breeding ground for terrorist activity both within
Russia and abroad.

			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
This monograph examines the underlying issues
behind the continuing low-level Islamist insurgency
movement in the Russian North Caucasus. It begins
by analyzing the history of relations between the Russian and the North Caucasus nations, focusing specifically on the process of subjugating the region by the
Russian Empire. Since the 18th century, Russia has
used brutal force to expand territorially to the Caucasus. The mistreatment of the North Caucasus continued after World War I and especially during and after
World War II, when entire North Caucasus nations
faced persecution and forcible deportations to remote
parts of the Soviet Union—in which up to 30 percent
of the exiles perished. Thus, the Russians planted the
seeds of resentment and hatred toward them that persist to the present time.
These tragic events lie at the heart of the grudges
the Chechens, the Ingush, the Circassians, and other
North Caucasus nations feel against the Russians.
Right after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe
and the breakup of the Soviet Union, these grudges
came to the surface. Chechnya tried to break free from
what the Chechens considered occupation of their
lands by the infidel Russians. Its attempt was suppressed in two wars so as to preserve the territorial
integrity of the Russian Federation.
The First Chechen War lasted from 1994 to 1996
and revealed a startling lack of combat readiness of
the Russian military. However, Russia learned military lessons from the botched 1994-96 campaign and
handily won the Second Chechen War of 1999-2000.
Both Chechen wars resulted in tens of thousands of
casualties (both military and civilian) and hundreds of
thousands of refugees.
ix

After the wars, Moscow used vast funds to rebuild
Chechnya materially, but the grudges of the people
have remained. Stability in Chechnya now depends
on the current Kremlin-appointed Chechen president,
Ramzan Kadyrov. Moscow continues to allocate significant federal funds for Chechnya and turns a blind
eye to local corrupt practices, which are often a direct
violation of the Russian federal law.
Without immediate, thorough, and concerted
international action, the challenges that the North
Caucasus presents to the world may grow into major problems. The United States must engage its allies
and work with Russia to strengthen its border security, invigorate law enforcement and counterterrorist
cooperation with national and international agencies,
counter Islamist propaganda, improve intelligence capabilities, and appeal for international cooperation to
eliminate the financial support of terrorism that helps
North Caucasus militant groups flourish.

x

RUSSIA’S COUNTERINSURGENCY
IN NORTH CAUCASUS:
PERFORMANCE AND CONSEQUENCES
The Strategic Threat of Religious Extremism
and Moscow’s Response
The Russian North Caucasus, including the Republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia, is
transforming into a dangerous, ungovernable area in
which global Islamic terrorism thrives. After conventional military operations of 1994-96 and 1999-2000
ended, the region has become a nexus for spreading
global jihadi violence, as the attack on the Boston
Marathon by the Tsarnaev brothers demonstrated.
Al-Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri called the North Caucasus “one of three primary fronts in the war against
the West”1—something many in the West, including
United States, have not noticed. This is a threat not
just to Russia, but also to Europe—and global stability. While Russia and North Caucasian peoples had
endured war, violence, and upheaval since the 1700s,
the region’s unprecedented emergence as a center of
global Islamic terrorism is a recent phenomenon that
started in the mid-1990s.
Terrorism as a tactic among North Caucasusbased Islamist groups is a recent trend but has swiftly
catapulted into the primary form of violence against
Russia and the global Salafi-jihadi movement’s international targets. The radical North Caucasus groups
include Jamaat Shariat (the Dagestani Front of the
Caucasus Emirate’s Armed Forces), Yarmuk Jamaat
(the Armed Forces of the United Vilayat [Province]
of Kabarda-Balkaria-Karachai), Ingush Jamaat, Riyyadus Salihin headed by Amir Khamzat, and Doku
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Umarov’s Caucasus Emirate, established in 2007 and
declared a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department on May 26, 2011.2 The goals of these groups
include: 1) discourage Russian authorities from fighting the terrorists, who have a “long-war” strategy to
bog down their adversaries with attacks on military
and civilian targets; 2) spread Islamist ideology “by
example” and recruit North Caucasus youth for the
“holy war” against Russia as well as for global jihad;
and, 3) fight to create the “Caucasus emirate” (Imarat
Kavkaz). The latter is a self-proclaimed state entity
that would stretch over the entire North Caucasus. Its
main goal is to secede from Russia and form an independent state, ruled by Sharia law.
Terrorism in the North Caucasus was pioneered by
the Chechen fighters in the 1990s, when forces commanded by Shamil Basayev executed Pervomaysk and
Budyonnovsk attacks. In Budyonnovsk in June 1995,
195 terrorists led by Basayev took around 1,500 civilians hostage in the village in the Stavropol District. As
a result of the attack, 129 people were killed and 415
injured. The operation was a success for the terrorists,
who released the hostages after Moscow granted them
a safe passage to Chechnya. In Pervomaysk in January 1996, a group of rebel fighters took 36 policemen
hostage while trying to cross the nearby border into
Chechnya. They managed to escape the several-day
siege of the village conducted by the Russian military and made it to Chechnya, albeit with significant
casualties (153 out of several hundred rebel fighters
were killed).3
The astonishing Dubrovka Theater siege in 2002,
the 2005 Beslan school massacre, and the 2011 Domodedovo Airport bombing represent the extent to which
North Caucasian terrorists are ready to fight and kill
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for global jihad. However, it appears that the Islamist
fighters adjust their tactics and occasionally respond
to public criticism. For instance, Doku Umarov has
publicly stated that he ordered his fighters to stop civilian attacks.4 He justified the order by stating that
Russian civil society does not support the Putin regime and is its hostage in the same way as the Chechen fighters are for their independence. Nevertheless,
the threat to Russia and the world, including civilians,
remains severe.
In order to provide adequate policy, military, and
security solutions, U.S. military planners and security providers should understand the history, geography, politics, and religious conflicts that are pertinent to the issue at hand. This is what this monograph
attempts to accomplish.
HISTORY OF WARFARE AND
COUNTERINSURGENCY ALONG RUSSIA’S
CAUCASUS BORDERLANDS
Russia and the nations of the Northern Caucasus
have been in perpetual conflict since the 18th century,
when Russia’s military under Catherine the Great annexed the region into the Russian Empire. From the
first Russian invasions of the area in the early 18th
century through the Caucasian War of 1817 to 1864,
historians and novelists, such as Leo Tolstoy (the author of Hadji Murat, a short novel) have depicted the
numerous battles between the Russians and the nations that make up the Caucasus and their complex
relationships.5 Tolstoy writes:
The red-haired Gamzalo was the only one Loris-Melikov [a Russian official, A.C.] did not understand. He
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saw that that man was not only loyal to Shamil but
felt an insuperable aversion, contempt, repugnance,
and hatred for all Russians, and Loris-Melikov could
therefore not understand why he had come over to
them. It occurred to him that, as some of the higher
officials suspected, Hadji Murad’s surrender and his
tales of hatred of Shamil [the rebel commander, A.C.]
might be false, and that perhaps he had surrendered
only to spy out the Russians’ weak spots that, after
escaping back to the mountains, he might be able to
direct his forces accordingly. Gamzalo’s whole person
strengthened this suspicion.6

Imperial Russia and subsequently the Soviet Union
have had a substantial impact on the history, identity,
and development of the entire Caucasus. Tsarist Russia needed North Caucasus to secure its connections
to and the rule over Southern Caucasus, to establish a
bridgehead against the Ottoman Empire and Iran, and
to extend its Black Sea coastline. To capture Northern
Caucasus, Russia used extensive military force, ethnic
cleansing, agricultural colonization, and oppression
to force the local Islamic tribes under its rule.7
However, since the first battles in the 18th century
through the present day, Russia has failed to fully and
effectively suppress the separatist tendencies of the
Northern Caucasian peoples, who have maintained
their culture, language, Islamic religion, and therefore, a distinct and at times hostile identity from Slavic
Orthodox Russians.
Islam has been an integral part of Northern Caucasian identity since the late-7th century,8 when
Arab conquerors first introduced it to the region. Some
local tribes adopted the religion later than others. The
first to do so were those in Dagestan, specifically the
Avars and Lezgins, and this slow Islamization lasted

4

from roughly the 8th to the 12th centuries. Chechens
were much later, adopting Islam during the 15th and
16th centuries, while the nations of the Western part
of the North Caucasus finally did so 2 centuries later.9
Meanwhile, their southern neighbors Georgia and
Armenia continued to follow the Christian Orthodox
tradition, each having its own autocephalous Church.
For an illustration of ethnic divisions in North Caucasus, see Map 1.

Map 1. North Caucasus Ethnic Divisions.10
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Despite elements of paganism among the tribes,
and Islam not being as fundamentalist as in other areas, Islam was and remains a significant factor that
helped unify the many diverse ethnic groups of the
fragmented region. As seen on Map 1, the Caucasus is
home to a variegated collection of tribes, nations, and
cultures that have lived in a small area for centuries
with continuous intertribal strife and limited interethnic mixing. Each of the empires, Russian, Ottoman,
Iranian, and Mongol, that have occupied the region
left visible legacies.
Russia’s Use of Overwhelming Force.
In order to open military maneuver space in the
South Caucasus, Black Sea area, and to prepare bridgeheads for the onslaught against the declining Ottoman
Empire, Russian imperial forces began their invasions
of the North Caucasus starting in the 18th century and
continuing into the 19th century. The imperial Army
and the Cossacks primarily used brutal, overwhelming force that resulted in the complete devastation of
villages and towns with high numbers of deaths and
refugees.11
During the Caucasus war, General Alexei Petrovich Yermolov, the most prominent Russian general
in the field, used the tactic of carrots and sticks. As
a stick to punish Chechen rebels committing crimes
against the Russians, he used ethnic cleansing, burned
down villages, and cut down forests. He would order
attacks even if he knew that Russian losses would be
significant. Yermolov punished the rebellious Chechens by burning their villages, destroying their forces,
beating them in skirmishes that never developed into
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battles, and, occasionally even seeking to win them
over by an unwanted display of clemency.12
He writes in his memoirs:
In order to punish the Chechens who were constantly
robbing villages, . . . I wanted to turn them out of the
Aksayev lands, which they inhabited. . . . I knew that
attacking their villages in hardly accessible and forest
areas would lead to significant casualties on our side,
if the villagers did not remove their wives, children
and property first; they always protect these desperately, and only an example of an horror can induce
them to do so.13

Yermolov also used the “scorched earth” approach, burning all occupied territories to ashes in
order to prevent the deported population from being
tempted to recolonize the places they once inhabited.
Hostile tribes were pushed high into the mountains
where many starved, while others were forced to settle in Russian-controlled lowlands. These tactics gave
Russia the upper hand and facilitated the subjugation
of the North Caucasus peoples. With these actions,
Yermolov and his disciples planted the seeds of future
hatred between the highlanders of the Caucasus and
the Russians.
Yermolov also made use of carrots, attempting to
lure the local elites to the Russian side through various
gifts and concessions. The local elites were recruited to
serve the Russians, and were given salaries as if they
represented the Russian leadership in the areas they
controlled.14 Cooptation of and cooperation with local
ethnic elites was a cornerstone of the Russian empire
in general. In other words, Russian leadership used
their counterparts from the ethnic groups they came
to dominate to ensure metropolitan rule.
7

Another tactic worth mentioning is the frequent
use of abatises (Rus. zaseki). These were obstacles
formed with the branches of trees laid in a row, with
the sharpened ends directed toward the enemy. The
trees are usually interlaced or tied with wire. I. Drozdov, a contemporary Russian officer, writes that the
Russian troops built abatises immediately upon arriving at the location of their temporary camp.15 Once the
highlanders attacked these defensive obstacles, they
became an easy target for Russian shooters hidden
behind them.
Yet, the highlanders fought back. Imam Shamil, a
political and religious leader of the Muslim tribes of
the North Caucasus, put up the most fierce resistance
against the powerful Russian army for 25 years (183459). Initially, he tried to avoid direct battles with the
Russian forces as he recognized that his position was
not sound enough, and he did not wish to waste lives.
Instead, he concentrated on solving internal problems,
and for a period of time he was able to concentrate
his power and avoid major confrontations with the
Russian forces. Vladimir Degoyev, a Russian historian and a contemporary scholar of North Caucasus
history, quotes Shamil, who described his hit-and-run
tactics as “hare’s run.”16 Over time, the radical members of the imamate intensified pressure on Shamil to
revise these tactics and become more aggressive.
In the early-1840s, Shamil’s charismatic leadership
allowed him to mobilize an army of more than 10,000
men within days. This newly realized strength, combined with the pressure from the local elite, motivated
Shamil to abandon the “hare’s run” approach and
take advantage of the momentum to initiate broad
offensive actions against the Russians. He hurried
to consolidate his gains and conquer new territories.
He led the war against the Russians as razziya, a holy
8

war in the name of Allah (also known as armed jihad
or the holy war), and known by its Russian/Caucasus equivalent term, gazavat. By proclaiming liberation from the oppression of the infidel, Shamil facilitated the consolidation of his power over his newly
conquered lands.
Vladimir Degoyev writes:
He [Shamil] . . . had a character that could not be impressed by personal material benefits, which so much
satisfied other rulers with not so much integrity and
which were something that could be traded with Russia. Because of this very reason, it was incomparably
easier for Russia to deal with feudal lords than to deal
with Shamil. Political, state, ideological and cultural
conceptions of Shamil and Russia diverged completely, leaving no space for an effective compromise. Russia was an obstacle for Shamil, just like Shamil was an
obstacle for Russia.17

Unlike the Russian wars with Turkey and Iran,
wars with Shamil were more difficult, due to his unexpected tactics deemed “barbarian” by the Russians.
Degoyev writes that the more the Russian generals
adhered to the conventional tactics they were taught,
the more losses they suffered. Shamil forced the Russians to fight an unconventional war, to which they
had trouble adapting. His military talent was based on
taking advantage of the unique flexibility of his troops
and on understanding the impossibility of defeating
the Russians in an open battle. Despite the impression
that Shamil’s tactics lacked coherence, he always had
a plan that took into account the peculiarities of each
battle, especially the terrain. He usually attacked the
flanks and the rear first, avoiding head-on clashes.
Shamil also paid due attention to defense. He built a
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series of defensive posts, each of which was meant to
weaken and exhaust the enemy.
Examples of such tactical successes include the
Ichkerinsky Battle in 1842 and the Battle of Dargo in
May and June 1845. The Ichkerinsky Battle took place
from May 30 to June 2, and the Chechens used tactics
of “loose formation” (Rus. rassypnoy stroy) and “migrating artillery,” consisting mostly of captured cannons.18 The Russians tried to take advantage of the fact
that the main forces of Imam Shamil were in Dagestan at that time. Nevertheless, the Russians under the
command of Adjutant-General Pavel Grabbe had to
withdraw after losing 66 officers.
In the Battle of Dargo, Shamil and the highlanders again avoided direct clashes with the Russians.
They constructed a series of fortifications, which gave
them time to fire at the enemy as they were overcoming each obstacle. These tactics increased the number
of Russian casualties but were insufficient to keep the
Russians out of Dargo. On July 6, 1845, Dargo was
conquered by the Russians.19 Before abandoning the
city, they burned it to the ground.
During the 17th to the 19th centuries, the flatlands
north of the Terek River gradually came under control of the Cossack settlements and the Russian military.20 While the Russians were able to inflict serious
damage, the mountainous terrain south of the Terek
proved very difficult for the imperial military. Chechen and forces of other nations resisting the Russians
could hide and organize in the mountains while defending themselves from the advancing forces. This
enabled the North Caucasus to battle the Russian invasion forces long after the annexation of Georgia in
1801, Armenia in the early-1810s, and Azerbaijan in
the late-1820s.21
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Beyond military subjugation, the Russian Empire
did not have a cohesive strategy to introduce the Russian culture through “soft-power” means that would
seek to attract peoples of the Caucasus to their orbit.
Instead, in parts of the region, the main goal of the
Russian leadership was to “liberate” the Caucasus
from the local indigenous people via ethnic cleansing.22 New Russian settlements were built on the territories emptied by the advancing forces. These settlements were to serve as a means of an eventual full
Russification of the region and for further penetrating
into the mountainous territories.
In order to secure the area around the settlements,
large amounts of forests were cut down, forcing the
locals to abandon their comfortable living areas in the
lowlands. As I. Drozdov, a Russian officer and eye
witness, wrote in 1877:
In late February [1864] the Pshekh battalion moved to
the river of Marte in order to observe how the mountain dwellers were being deported, and, if necessary,
in order to evict them by force. . . . The view was atrocious: scattered corpses of children, women and elders, torn, eaten by dogs; migrants exhausted by famine and diseases, who could barely move, kept falling
on the ground out of exhaustion, being eaten alive by
hungry dogs. . . . On May 28, 1864, the Caucasian war
was over. The Kuban Oblast’ [roughly corresponding to today’s Krasnodar Kray–A.C.] was conquered
as well as “cleansed.” Only a handful of people were
left out of a formerly large population that once lived
there.23

Russia had limited means to introduce the Christian Orthodox religion as a meaningful alternative to
Islam, since the Caucasian ethnic groups, and especially their leaders, used Islam as a unifying force against
11

the Russians. Thus, the highlander tribes would never
accept the Russian Orthodox Church, as it was the
faith of the “infidel enemy.”24
With a limited “soft-power” tool box, tsarist Russia had to rely on violence and the destruction of the
North Caucasus tribes to control the region. Though
they managed to colonize the region outright, military
power never fully extinguished the desire among indigenous peoples to shake off the Russian yoke. One
of the North Caucasus nations that was a victim of the
Russian expansionary policy was the Circassians. The
tragedy of the Circassians was that they were unable
to unite against the common enemy. The 12 stars on
the current flag of Adygea symbolize the 12 original
Circassian tribes, although their real number was allegedly even higher.25 A prince led each tribe, and the
number of internal disputes among the tribes was significant. Their divisiveness determined the outcome
of their war against the Russian forces. Having lost,
entire Circassian clans were forced to flee their homeland, and most of them did not survive. They either
drowned in the sea on their way to Anatolia when the
overloaded Turkish boats sank, or died from hunger
and diseases in relocation camps.26
It is worth noting that Russia was not the only
power that used harsh methods to enlarge its territory
and subjugate the people that lived along its perimeter or in the colonies. The 19th century was one of
struggle of large powers for dominance, and similar
approaches were used by other empires, such as the
British, French, Ottoman, as well as the expanding
United States.
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AFTER WORLD WAR I
Following World War I and during the Russian
Civil War (1918-21), Chechnya initially supported
tsarist forces. However, later it switched sides and
supported the Bolsheviks. The reason for this was a
series of myopic mistakes made by General Anton Denikin, the commander of the anti-communist (White)
southern Russian forces, in his treatment of the North
Caucasus nations. First, Denikin ignored the level of
alienation and the atheism the Bolsheviks imposed on
the traditional life of the Muslim highlanders. Second,
blinded by the imperialism permeating other tsarist
generals (“Russia one and undivided”), Denikin and
his men turned the highlander peoples against them.27
The White forces myopically viewed this strategy as
a new conquest of the Caucasus, which did not allow for alliances with the local Chechen and Ingush
leadership, who initially were willing to fight the Red
Army on the side of the Whites.
Practical actions of Denikin only intensified the
alienation of the North Caucasus people from the
White army. He punished the Chechens and wanted them to “pay back” for all losses suffered by
the Don and Kuban Cossacks, who fought on the
tsarist side. Both the Chechens and the Ingush responded with a fierce resistance and expelled Denikin’s forces from the area. Other strategic mistakes
added to the Chechen and Ingush defiance. Just
like Yermolov more than half a century before him,
Denikin made use of “scorched earth” tactics, which
further alienated the North Caucasian nationalities.28
The new Soviet leadership made its own mistakes
in the North Caucasus. It was openly hostile toward
Islam, rudely ignored the mountaineers’ traditions
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and used the total expropriation approach of “military
communism” that existed in Russia in 1918–21.29 They
provided for the abolition of private banks, nationalization of industry, central planning, government monopoly on commerce, equal distribution of material
goods, and mandatory labor.30 This approach of the
Communists quickly cooled down the enthusiasm of
the mountaineers, who initially welcomed the arrival
of the Red Army. However, despite their mistakes, the
Soviets were willing, at least on paper, to grant them a
certain level of autonomy, proclaimed in the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia.31 Despite
their promises, disillusionment with the Red dictatorship set in quickly.
Stalin Cracks Down.
During the time of the Russian Civil War (1918-21)
and the establishment of the Soviet Union (1922), the
Red Army crushed the Caucasian revolt with mercilessness similar to that of the Tsar. After the defeat
of the White Armies, including the ones of the Don
and the Kuban Cossacks, the Soviet Union retained
ethnic Russians’ dominance over the region using the
new military technologies of World War I: tanks, airpower, modern artillery, and chemical weapons. The
Caucasus tribes, on the other hand, were primarily using the same weapons they had in the 18th and 19th
centuries.32
Then an ethnic Georgian, Joseph Stalin, born Iosif
(Soso) Djugashvili in the Georgian town of Gori, became, first, the Commissar for Nationalities, and then
the leader of the Soviet Union. The peoples of the
Caucasus entered into a new chapter of relations with
Moscow that would soon see their nations torn out at
the roots.
14

As World War II raged, Stalin accused Northern Caucasus peoples, especially Chechens, Ingush,
Karachays, and Balkars (as well as Kalmyks and
Crimean Tatars), of treason against the state and alleged collusion with the Nazis, despite the lack of
any credible evidence.33Although many Caucasian
highlanders fought valiantly in the Red Army in
World War II, Stalin punished even veterans, their
families, and their nations with death, imprisonment, and brutal relocation to Siberia and Central
Asia. In this ethnic cleansing, up to one-third of
Chechens died.
The operation aimed at deporting the Chechens
and the Ingush from their homes in the North Caucasus, called Operation LENTIL, started in February
1944. According to a cable sent to Stalin by Beria, who
personally supervised the expulsion, 478,479 Chechens and Ingush were deported within the first week
of the operation.34 The data on the total number of deported people vary. A cable sent to Stalin in July 1944
states that 602,193 people were moved from the North
Caucasus into the Kazakh and Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist
Republics, most of whom were Chechens and Ingush
(428,948), followed by Karachays (68,327) and Balkars
(37,406). Another cable lists the total number of deported Chechens, Ingush, Kalmyks, and Karachays as
650,000.35
The excuse and formal justification to undertake
these deportations varied from nation to nation, but
were of a similar nature. For instance, the Karachays
were accused of “treacherous behavior, joining German-organized battalions in order to fight the Soviet
leadership, betraying honest Soviet citizens to the Germans, accompanying the German troops and showing
them the way. . .”36 After the end of the war, they were
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accused of “resisting Soviet actions,” and “hiding bandits and German agents.” Kalmyks were charged with
“betraying the Motherland, joining German battalions
in order to fight the Red Army, betraying honest Soviet
citizens to the Germans, and giving the Germans communal cattle from the Rostov Oblast and Ukraine.”
Similarly to the Karachays after the war the Kalmyks
were accused of “actively resisting Soviet efforts of rebuilding the economy destroyed by the Germans” and
“terrorizing the surrounding population.”37 Crimean
Tatars were allegedly guilty of “treacherous actions
against the Soviet nation.”38
Like his tsarist predecessors, in the place of the
“punished” groups, Stalin resettled ethnic Russians in
order to dominate the indigenous ethnicities through
demographic warfare rather than conventional warfare alone. Since the Soviet Union mandated an atheist society, the Kremlin also cracked down on Islam,
cutting ties with overseas institutions of learning and
banning Hajj. Stalin’s idea was to change North Caucasian tribal and Islamic civilization and culture to
the socialist realist fare the rest of the country was already experiencing. The communist party shut down
mosques, hounded mullahs, destroyed Buddhist monasteries of the Kalmyks, and murdered or imprisoned
the lamas.
After Nikita Khrushchev’s recognition of Stalin’s
atrocities and the “cult of personality,” he allowed
exiled Chechen, Ingush, and others to return to their
native lands from the exile as a part of Khrushchev’s
“thaw” policies during his reign. While many (but not
all) returned to their ancestral homelands, they still
were unable to fully practice their religion and some of
their cultural traditions due to the restrictions placed
on all Soviet citizens. As a result, the remnants of their
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customs went underground; however, as tribal elders
found great difficulty in transferring their traditions
and practices to the young, after repatriation in 195657, North Caucasus became bereft of cultural and religious leaders who would preserve the Islamic Sufi
tradition during post-Stalinist Soviet period.39 This
religious and cultural vacuum in the region became
fertile grounds for the new Salafi forms of Islam that
infiltrated North Caucasus in 1990s, and encountered
little competition from the traditional, moderate forms
of Islam.40
COLLAPSE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE FIRST
CHECHEN WAR (LATE-1980s TO 1994)
During the last years of the Soviet Union through
the early years of the Russian Federation, Chechnya
and Dagestan showed the most prolific renaissance of
Islam and nationalism among all the Northern Caucasus. With the Soviet ideological control beginning
to disappear, most people in the region revived their
sense of religious, ethnic, and cultural identity, which
had existed before the USSR. One reason for the quick
rise in nationalism and the quest for independence
was the impact of the tsarist oppression and Stalinist
expulsions. Though not the only ethnic group to suffer
from ethnic cleansing by the Romanoff empire or Soviet Russia, the Chechen leadership of the early-1990s
consisted of figures who were born and/or raised in
exile in Kazakhstan—and bore the grudge.41
Nationalism and the bitter memories that united
the Chechen people against the Moscow-based Russian
government created the strong yearning for Chechen
independence, while other Caucasian republics were
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less rebellious. In addition, from the 1980s through the
1990s, Islam was going through a renaissance. All of
the North Caucasus republics experienced an increase
in Islamic activity, partly as a result of “glasnost” and
the Russians’ inability to regulate religion and partly
due to opening of the borders to outgoing and incoming religiously-related travel, including Hajj and
study abroad.42
New forms of Islam, however, had origins outside
of the region. The newly introduced Salafi/Wahhabi
sects were radical and had roots in Saudi Arabia and
in Salafism throughout the Middle East and Pakistan.
These imported religious teachers were well-financed,
and their following drew on the fanaticism and enthusiasm of the separatists, ready to use force and
faith to achieve their goals. Initially, most of North
Caucasus society, especially the elders, rejected these
Islamist imports. They had no desire to adopt novel
forms of Islam built on radicalism that would seek to
overhaul the traditions that the region had fought to
uphold for generations and sought to preserve and to
resurrect. Meanwhile, many younger people had little
knowledge and appreciation of the historical connections between themselves and their heritage, which
made them vulnerable to radical Islam’s influence
and appeal.43
In the early-1990s, the socio-economic situation
in the Soviet Union/Russia and the Northern Caucasus sharply deteriorated, undermining the hopes for
a peaceful and prosperous post-Soviet future while
quietly integrating into post-communist Russian Federation. The chaotic disintegration of the Soviet Union
led to the independence of 14 republics and to the creation of the Russian Federation under the leadership
of Boris Yeltsin.

18

In the South Caucasus, the former Soviet Socialist
Republics of the USSR, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan became independent states in 1991. The North
Caucasus region consisted of Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republics (ASSRs), which were subordinate
to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
(RSFSR). When the Soviet Union dissolved, Moscow
would not authorize these nations, which constituted
autonomous republics, to create sovereign states.44
As a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union,
Moscow witnessed the loss of its empire, including
regions that had both a geostrategic value and were
considered legitimately under Russian control due to
decades spent conquering them. President Yeltsin and
the majority of Russian elites, including liberals and
nationalists, believed that further losses of Russian
territory to secession of various national-territorial autonomous republics could bring about the disintegration of the Russian historic core. Needing to preserve
what was left of the “Motherland,” Yeltsin could not
afford to yield independence to any rebel territory.
His famous phrase, “take as much sovereignty as you
can carry away,” applied to pacific lands, willing to
patiently and peacefully negotiate disagreements,
such as Tatarstan, not the rebel Chechnya.45
Thus, Russia’s approach to post-Soviet Chechnya has been a mix of modern strategic goals of state
preservation and resistance to centrifugal processes,
together with obsolescent military tactics of overwhelming, imprecise fire power, ham-handed counterinsurgency, and roots dating back to the Caucasus
wars of the 18th and 19th centuries.
Around the time of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, former Soviet Air Force general Dzhokhar Dudayev, an ethnic Chechen, was elected president of
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the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya on October
27, 1991, which remained a part of the new Russian
Federation. He gained 90.1 percent of the votes,46 although his opponents accused him of falsifying the
results. Upon witnessing the independence of former
Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe and Union republics, some of them smaller than Chechnya, Dudayev
declared Chechnya independent as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria immediately upon his election.47
With the Chechen declaration of independence and
the Russian resistance, both sides reverted to an active
state of hostility. On November 8, Yeltsin issued a decree declaring a state of emergency in Chechnya. In
1992, Russia and the Chechen separatists held several
rounds of fruitless talks dedicated to the normalization of relations. The year 1993 can be characterized by
the Kremlin’s confrontation with the rebellious antiYeltsin parliament, making integration impossible.
After a period of a de facto Chechen independence in
1991–94, in the fall of 1994 Yeltsin and his administration refocused on the North Caucasus. In December
1994, Moscow re-invaded Chechnya.
The First Chechen War (1994-96).
The conditions at the beginning of the First Chechen War were similar to many cases of decolonization
worldwide. The metropolis was weakened by internal
strife, while the peripheral elite desired to shake loose
the imperial chains. Relations between Chechnya and
Russia were contentious. Svante E. Cornell points out
that the Chechen military elite was not interested in a
negotiated dialogue with Moscow to create a compromise that would allow Chechnya to live in peaceful
coexistence within the Russian Federation.48 In fact,
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other Muslim-majority regions like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and many of the North Caucasian republics
managed to come to agreements with President Yeltsin on their constitutional status.49 Several reasons can
explain this difference. First, compared to the other
Russian republics, Chechnya’s population is highly
homogenous. According to the 2002 census, the share
of Chechens was 93.5 percent.50 In contrast, only 52.9
percent of the population of Tatarstan was Tatars and
almost 40 percent were Russians. Similarly, in Bashkortostan, the largest ethnic group in 2002 was the
Russians (36.1 percent), followed by the Bashkirs (29.5
percent) and Tatars (25.4 percent). Russians in Dagestan constituted only 4.7 percent of the population in
2002. However, the population of Dagestan does not
have a majority ethnic group, but instead is made up
of several main nationalities, such as the Avars (29.4
percent), Dargyns (16.5 percent), and Kumiks (14.2
percent). It was more difficult for the non-Russian
populations of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and most
other republics of the RSFSR to organize strong movements for independence, since they did not have a
dominant ethnic group as a secessionist support base.
Second, Chechen separatists were supported by
outside forces. According to a Russian source, foreign
mercenaries from 15 countries fought the Russian federal forces in the First Chechen War.51 In the Second
Chechen War of 1999–2000, the number of the countries represented rose to 52. In 2000, the number of
foreign mercenaries reached 600–700 people.
Third, the Chechen leadership was set against any
deal with Russia. In his last interview, former Russian
defense minister Pavel Grachev discusses how neither
he nor Dudayev wanted war.52 Grachev says Dudayev
must have reacted (by declaring independence), be-
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cause Moscow flatly refused to talk to him, and in
such a situation, the Chechen leadership and nation
would reject Dudayev’s inaction.
The majority of the Chechen elite believed that independence was the sole option, and that their people
could live freely and peacefully only if they had a
clean break from Russia.53 This enduring political philosophy among the Chechens was very similar to their
unwillingness to compromise with imperial Russian
forces, beginning with the first invasions in the 18th
century and to their refusal to acquiesce to Russia’s
occupation ever since. The Stalinist expulsions in the
1940s and the attempted eradication of Islam in the
region only confirmed what the Chechens believed for
centuries: The Russians could not be relied upon to
protect them and to ensure their freedom to live how
they wish.
Nonetheless, the negotiations lasted from March
1992 to January 1993, but the talks ultimately failed.54
The Kremlin then tried to implement a “coercive
diplomacy” approach by adopting a more belligerent tone toward the Chechen leaders in an attempt
to compel them to make a deal similar to their other
Muslim counterparts, but these efforts also failed. In
November 1994, the Russians tried to execute a coup
against Dudayev, in part by organizing pro-Moscow
Chechens to oust their leader.55 The attempted coup
was a massive defeat for the Russians.
Before the war, Defense Minister Grachev made a
failed attempt to transform the North Caucasus into
a buffer military district meant to shield Russia from
the instability in the South Caucasus. This step would
mean sending the best battalions into the region. What
happened in reality was the exact opposite. Most of
the battalions moved to the North Caucasus were
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unprepared for the war and almost totally lost their
fighting ability during the war. Trying to contain this
negative trend, the military leadership tried to put together battalions that were still able to fight, but even
this strategy turned out to be insufficient to defeat the
Chechen guerilla fighters.
Following the series of failures, Moscow intensified its efforts. The Russian military leadership misinterpreted the Dudayev government’s lack of engagement with pro-Moscow Chechens as a weakness or a
haplessness on the part of the separatists. They did
not realize, according to Ilyas Akhmadov and Miriam Lanskoy et al., that the Chechens were hesitant to
kill each other in the fear that this would spark blood
feuds and vendettas between Chechen clans that had
plagued the nation centuries before.56 Vendettas are a
part of the tribal culture of the Caucasus Mountains.
In part, as a result of this miscalculation, Russian
forces assumed that any incursion into Grozny would
be easy and incur with minimal Russian casualties.
They were wrong. For the ill-fated November 1994
invasion, the Federal Counterintelligence Service had
assembled elite tank squadrons for an attack on Grozny. Chechen forces ambushed them with ease and
took many Russian soldiers as prisoners. This failure sparked criticism of then-defense minister Pavel
Grachev, who had famously said that he would capture Grozny with one paratroops battalion in 2 hours.57
He later justified his statement by stating that it would
really have been possible providing that he could fight
by all the rules of warfare, meaning the availability
of unlimited aviation, artillery, etc. In such case, he
claimed, the remaining rebel fighter bands could have
really been destroyed or captured with one airborne
battalion. But this was an ex-post-facto justification.
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The Russian reaction to the humiliating failure to
capture Grozny was to boost its forces and essentially
declare war, retake Chechnya, and restore Russian
pride and control. The Russian assault on Grozny began in December 1994 and was met with heavy resistance from the Chechen forces on the ground. In order
to engulf Chechnya in a “shock-and-awe” assault, the
Russian military subjected Grozny and other major
Chechen cities to an intense air bombardment that all
but obliterated them, resulting in tens of thousands of
civilian casualties and hundreds of thousands of refugees.58 They were the first Russian cities destroyed
since World War II—and as utterly as the cities obliterated by the Nazis.
After 2 months of initial engagement, the Russian
army conquered most of Chechnya and forced the
separatists to flee into the southern mountains, where
they regrouped.59 Despite Dudayev’s assassination
in April 1996 by a Russian precision-guided missile,
Chechen forces successfully recaptured Grozny from
the Russians after a few days of fighting; both sides
signed a cease-fire agreement known as the Khasavyurt Accord a few weeks thereafter.60
During this war, the Chechen rebels launched their
first terrorist attack and hostage standoff on a hospital in Budyonnovsk in Stavopolsky Krai. The guerilla
commando unit, led by Shamil Basayev, consisted of
about 150 Chechen rebels. On June 14, 1995, the terrorists stormed the unguarded hospital and took 2,000
hostages.61 The Russian Special Forces were called
in the following day,62 and the operation to neutralize the rebels was launched on June 17. However, it
failed to completely liberate the hospital. On June 18,
Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin negotiated with
Basayev over the phone and accepted some of Ba-
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sayev’s demands, including a safe passage to Chechnya. During the siege, 129 people died and 415 were
injured.63 This is the earliest terrorist attack credited
to the Chechens, and is believed to have reinvigorated the fight against the Russians.64 This is also the
largest hostage taking event ever to occur in Russian
territory.65
The Chechen Tactics.
An important figure that supported the Chechens
in their separatist efforts against Moscow was Ibn alKhattab, a Saudi citizen who joined the Chechen war
in late 1994. Khattab secured international financing
of the separatists, procuring weapons and building
terrorist preparation camps in Chechnya. One of the
most important elements of the hostilities in Chechnya
was a sniper war. Snipers were heavily relied upon
on the Chechen side, and the Russian federal forces
responded in the same way.
The Chechen separatists avoided direct contact
with the Russian forces. They preferred operating in
small units of three to five people.66 These units included a sniper, an rocket-propelled grenade (RPG)
operator/grenade launcher, a machine gunner, and
one or two submachine gunners. Their tactics were as
follows: the main group opens fire at the federal forces, while a sniper, often hidden in a tree and shielded
by the noise of the battle, neutralizes them. The separatists preferred short and frequent fire engagements
to avoid casualties.
The tactics of “fighting troikas” (Rus. boyevaya
troika) deserve special attention. It consisted of one
sniper, one grenade launcher, and one submachine
gunner. In a military operation, the gunner initiated
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the battle by opening fire at the enemy to provoke
them to fire back. The sniper identified the sources
of the enemy’s fire and destroyed them. Meanwhile,
the grenade launcher destroyed armored vehicles and
machinery. If the fighting troika was on the defense,
it quickly ambushed the Russian forces and hid in the
surrounding area. Once the Russian attack began, the
separatists were able to shoot at the enemy soldiers
from their hiding places only a short distance (100–150
yards) away. Snipers targeted the Russian commanders and the most active soldiers in order to spread
panic among the Russian troops.
The Chechens also widely used wounded Russian
troops as “bait.” They intentionally did not kill them,
but waited to ambush the Russian soldiers who came
to help their wounded comrades. Once the number of
the wounded Russian troops was large enough, the
Chechens systematically killed them.
The Russians used a combination of carrots and
sticks.67 The Russian leadership led an active campaign
among the Chechen population, calling upon it to persuade the rebels to leave their villages. Meanwhile, the
Russians kept taking control of high grounds around
Chechen towns, which rendered any armed resistance
meaningless. These tactics allowed the Russians to
capture the towns of Argun, Gudermes, and Shali
without fighting in 1995.
In battles, the Russians used massive fire barrages,
which turned out to be a wrong strategy for the type
of warfare they faced in Chechnya.68 Russian generals were using strategies that would be appropriate
in a large-scale military operation with a clearly defined battlefront, but not for guerilla war in Chechnya. Chechen battalions were highly mobile; they kept
splitting into smaller subunits, which later reunited.
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This Russian miscalculation, together with a superior
knowledge of the mountain landscape, allowed the
Chechens to avoid Russian artillery fire and air strikes.
There was no clear battlefront, and the federal forces
had to bomb civilian objects, causing noncombatant
casualties and uniting the Chechen people against the
Russian military. In other words, the Russians were
repeating the mistakes of their 19th-century forefathers, American commanders in Vietnam, and the Soviets in Afghanistan.
With the training that Chechen leaders received
while in the Soviet military, including fighting in
Afghanistan, the experiences some guerilla elements
such as Shamil Basayev had in fighting on the Russian
side against Georgians in Abkhazia and Armenians in
Nagorno-Karabakh—together with the abundance of
Soviet-era weaponry and better motivated troops—
gave Chechnya an advantage. Training provided by
al-Qaeda and other affiliated militant Islamists also
played an important role. For example, Shamil Basayev came to Afghanistan in 1994 and visited training camps in the province of Khost.69 He later received
training by and was in regular contact with al-Qaeda.
In total, several hundreds of Chechens were trained in
al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, and militant Islamist
groups also financially supported the recruitment of
fighters from neighboring Georgia and Azerbaijan.
Air power proved not to be the decisive factor expected to win the First Chechen War. The overreliance
on air power and its failure led to the Russian troops
being poorly supplied and trained, inadequately led,
demoralized, exhausted, and disorganized. In One
Soldier’s War, his memoir of Russian army life, Arkady
Babchenko writes:
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We stopped caring for ourselves, no longer washed,
shaved or brushed our teeth. After a week without
soap and water, our hands cracked and bled continually, blighted by eczema in the cold. We hadn’t
warmed ourselves by a fire for a whole week because
the damp reeds wouldn’t burn and there was nowhere
to gather firewood in the steppe. We began to turn
wild as the cold and wet and filth drove from us all
feelings apart from hatred, and we hated everything
on earth, including ourselves.70

The Chechens used creative tactics to defeat the
Russians in the city centers. As described in a RAND
Corporation report by Arthur L. Speyer III, the Chechen strategy in the cities was a “textbook example of
the modern urban guerilla.”71 In order to minimize casualties, the Russians would use tanks and air forces
without infantry to bombard various buildings where
rebels were believed to be hiding.72 Once Russian forces were deeply enmeshed in the city, the Chechens
would attack from positions in buildings alongside
the city streets, greatly relying on tried-and-tested
Russian RPGs used in packs.73 The entrances to these
buildings were barricaded from the inside, and the
top floors were unoccupied so that air attacks would
yield the least amount of Chechen casualties.74
The Russian command failed to fully take into account that even if the Chechens are forced to relinquish
temporary control of their cities and plains, they were
likely to recover while waiting out the enemy in the
mountains and come back with a vengeance, utilizing
their mountainous guerilla-style tactics.
The Chechens had a significant intelligence advantage because their leaders, including the Grozny
city engineer, had been preparing for an invasion of
the city for 2 years. Russian intelligence performed
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woefully, due to the lack of local sources and their
inability to fight an enemy whose language and traditions the ethnic Slavs were not familiar with and
whom they underestimated due to the darker hue of
their skin. Using tanks and planes in lieu of infantry
to storm each building led to the bogging down of
the Russian operations and their ultimate withdrawal
in 1996.
The First Chechen War was a spectacularly demoralizing defeat for the Russian political leadership and
the Russian military, which itself was undergoing an
identity crisis after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The strategy included an overwhelming use of air
power to destroy cities, kill and terrorize civilians, and
demolish the power centers of the Chechen separatists. This approach was counterproductive because it
caused severe civilian casualties and radicalized many
of those who remained neutral or even supported remaining a part of Russia.
The Russian General Staff did not realize that the
Chechens were trained by Islamist emissaries; the
training would be expanded in the interwar period of
1996-99 during the presidency of Aslan Maskhadov.
ASLAN MASKHADOV AND THE
INTERWAR PERIOD
In 1997, Colonel Aslan Maskhadov, an ex-Soviet
artillery officer who fought valiantly in the First
Chechen War, was elected president of the separatist
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. This proved that the
ordinary Chechens were tired of the war and hoped
Maskhadov would be able to find a compromise with
Moscow.75 Maskhadov, a talented and successful military commander, however, turned out to be a poor

29

politician. He was a hostage of the interests of influential field commanders, such as Shamil Basayev and
Salman Raduyev, whose resolve was stronger than
Maskhadov’s. The centralized economy and social
welfare system broke down for good. It was the right
of the stronger and the closeness to the sources of financing from Moscow’s federal budget that had the
ultimate deciding power.
As the president of Ichkeria, Maskhadov continued to think in military terms. He had to choose
whether to ally himself with Akhmad Kadyrov, who
brought together the opponents of Wahhabism, or
Shamil Basayev, who was preparing a military campaign to conquer Dagestan and create a larger state
(emirate) under the influence of the Wahhabist ideology. In that, the problems of 1990s are reminiscent of
those facing Imam Shamil in 1840s. Maskhadov chose
Basayev, backed by the strongest battalions of the
Ichkerian military.
During the interwar period, relations between
the Chechen separatists and the Taliban continued
to thrive.76 In 1997 and 1998, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev
and Movladi Udugov, two main Chechen terrorist
ideologues, visited the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and held meetings with Mullah Muhammad
Omar and Osama bin Laden. Konstantin Kosachev, a
former head of the State Duma Committee on International Relations, said, “We have reasons to believe
that Osama bin Laden was involved in a series of terrorist attacks in our country.”77
Russia in the Aftermath of the First Chechen War.
The Russian society was unprepared for what
started as a poorly organized military improvization
and morphed into the First Chechen War.78 Due to the
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lack of understanding of the reasons for the operation,
the attitude of the Russian public toward the political
leadership that initiated it and the generals that led it
was largely negative, and the leadership’s credibility
was hitting rock bottom. At a later stage of the war,
the public pressured Yeltsin to start negotiating with
the rebels.79
However, the attitude of ordinary Russians toward the ongoing Chechen conflict kept changing,
depending on the latest developments in the war. For
instance, in late-1995, after the federal forces failed
to achieve a breakthrough, as little as 3.2 percent of
the people supported continuing the war, while 51.1
percent supported an immediate withdrawal of the
troops.80 In November 1999, 62.5 percent supported
continuing the war after the federal forces neutralized
Basayev’s band and achieved noticeable successes in
the republic.81
The number of Russian casualties in the First
Chechen War was below the threshold that would
lead to mass antiwar protests. However, conscription
and the deployment of police units from all across the
country to fight in Chechnya contributed to a transformation of an initially local conflict into a nationwide
one. The return of large numbers of angry and demoralized veterans led to talks about Russia’s “Weimar
syndrome” in reference to pre-Nazi Germany, where
World War I veterans played a significant role in
political radicalization.
The military considered itself betrayed by the
chaotic actions of the Russian leadership and ostracized by the people. The failure to achieve victory
was unexpected by the public, which had gotten used
to regarding the Russian military as a formidable
force even against Europe and the United States.82
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Before the start of the war, the supreme military
leadership considered the upcoming deployment of
troops in Chechnya to be another “peace-keeping”
operation, similar in nature to those in, for example,
Transnistria.83
The peace agreement with Chechnya, signed in
1996, became a symbol of defeat and humiliation of
Russia—only 4 years after the inglorious abandonment of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, little energy had
been spent to learn from the failed Chechen war. One
of the possible reasons is that the military leadership
was hesitant to admit its defeat and instead chose to
play up the story about the betrayal by the politicians.
After the failed First Chechen War, the Kremlin
learned several military lessons. It understood the
necessity to estimate the military capabilities of the
separatists more objectively and to ensure better collection of and better quality information. The Russian
leadership recognized the need for political support
for the Army and law enforcement agencies, and that
the separatists could not be expected to keep their
ends of negotiated bargains due to their decentralized
structure.
Overall, the First Chechen War was lost to the wellorganized and led Chechen guerillas by an army that
did not draw the appropriate conclusions from its defeat in Afghanistan. Russia’s failure resonated around
the world, and the global reaction to it was surprise
and disdain. The communist colossus, which only
10 years earlier had the United States and the world
trembling, was defeated by a ragtag army of guerillas
in the territory the Russian empire had controlled for
over 200 years. The defeat greatly imperiled Russia’s
ambition to become a leading power in the post-Soviet
space and a serious player in the post-Cold-War world
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order. Nonetheless, Yeltsin, the Kremlin, the military,
and the nationalist elite across the board—communists, nationalists, and many liberals—remained committed to defeating the Chechen separatists. They did
not have to wait long to get a second chance. After
a brief and traumatic interwar period, extremists
provoked another disastrous war.
The Interwar Period in the North Caucasus
(1996-99).
In the Soviet Union, with its internationalist and
atheist ideology collapsed, religion and nationalism
began filling the political and spiritual void. While
Russians increasingly self-identified as Christian Orthodox Eastern Slavs, their opponents self-identified
as Chechens and Sunni Muslims. Dzokhar Dudayev
and his de facto Chechen government mainly used
separatism and independence as the motivating factors in fighting the Russians. Additionally, traditional
Sufi Islam was a stimulus that generated separatist
attitudes against the Russians. Traditional Sufi Islam
was never isolated from the idea of the Chechen nation, nor was it the primary factor that inspired the
Chechen forces to fight against the Russians and to die
for Chechnya in 1994-96.
After the end of the First Chechen War, however,
nonindigenous forms of Islam such as Salafi/Wahhabi, which were far more radical and global in scope,
began to enter aggressively into Chechnya and neighboring North Caucasian republics to exploit the desperate socioeconomic situation in war-torn region. A
significant problem that intensified in the period between the two wars was the Islamization of Chechnya.
Although Moscow signed a treaty with Chechnya that
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called for mutual relations based on the principles
of international law, Moscow failed to provide sufficient funds to rebuild the Chechen infrastructure
damaged or destroyed during the First Chechen War.
Social problems resulting from the neglect by Moscow provided a fertile ground for radical Islamic currents, such as Salafism or Wahhabism, to take hold in
the republic.84
The political course of the acting president Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in 1996-97, aimed at the rapid
Islamization of Chechnya, facilitated the spread of
Wahhabism in the republic.85 In order to strengthen
the Sharia law in Chechnya, Bagauddin Magomedov,
a radical Islamist leader active in Dagestan, was invited to visit. In September 1996, Yandarbiyev issued
a decree that abolished Russian law, banned civil
courts, and introduced an Islamic (Sharia) criminal
code, which was essentially copied from that of Saudi
Arabia.86 Islam was declared an official religion.
Not all leaders in Chechnya welcomed this new
course. The Chechen Islamization was opposed primarily by Aslan Maskhadov and Akhmad Kadyrov.
Maskhadov, who was a Prime Minister under Yandarbiyev, did not favor the hasty introduction of Islam
as an official religion as he feared that it could lead
to a fight for the title of imam, and that the Afghan or
Tajik scenarios of a religious war could be repeated
in Chechnya. Nevertheless, in his presidential campaign in 1997, Maskhadov, for reasons not entirely
clear, used the slogan of creating a “Chechen Islamic
state.” He might have wanted to steal a popular topic
from his political opponents, or perhaps he believed
that Sharia law was the only way to unify the fractious Chechens under an overarching ideology. On
July 25, 1998, Maskhadov organized a congress of the
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Muslims of the North Caucasus in Grozny. Its participants accused the Salafists/Wahhabists of extremism,
intervention in the Chechen political life, and insubordination to the official Chechen authorities. He also
called upon the Chechen president to get rid of members of his administration who supported this extremist ideology. The chief mufti of Chechnya, Akhmad
Kadyrov, also opposed the spreading of Salafism/
Wahhabism in Chechnya. He launched a campaign
aimed at discrediting Wahhabism as an alien ideology
and its preachers as agents of foreign secret services.
Nevertheless, Wahhabism in Chechnya was not eradicated. The Wahhabists allied themselves with other
religious radicals, who were proponents of an antiRussian jihad in the North Caucasus.
The fertile ground for radical Islam also caught the
attention of al-Qaeda, which was interested in taking
advantage of the situation to expand into new territories. In December 1996, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s second in command, tried to establish a new base
for the organization in Chechnya.87 He was arrested in
Dagestan and released in 1997.
However, the spread of radical Islam was not confined exclusively to Chechnya. In August 1999, rebels
under the command of al-Khattab and Basayev invaded two Dagestani regions bordering Chechnya and declared the creation of an Islamic state. In a subsequent
Russian military operation, three Wahhabist villages
where the radicals had taken hold were destroyed. In
the meantime, the territory of Chechnya was targeted
by a rocket attack from the federal forces. This invasion of Dagestan led to a full-fledged military operation, known as the Second Chechen War.
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Failures on Both Sides.
Russia missed the opportunity to establish a working relationship with moderate nationalists in Chechnya and Dagestan and, facilitated by its high-handed
tactics, the Salafist penetration of Chechnya and
North Caucasus.
With the economic depression in the region, high
unemployment—especially high youth unemployment—and destabilizing forces (ranging from criminal gangs to Islamist terrorists) began to establish safe
havens and thrive in interwar Chechnya.88 The First
Chechen War left Chechnya in a disastrous economic
situation, in which people had only slim prospects
for a bright future. Most of what had remained of the
economy was predominantly controlled by the secessionist leaders and their gangs. In this period, the
main sources of income for Chechnya were oil, drugs,
hostages, and federal subsidies from Moscow.
In the late-1990s, the main source of income for
Chechnya (other than federal subsidies) was oil.89
In 1997, Chechnya produced two million tons of oil
annually, according to official statistics. In late 1998,
official oil sales in Chechnya were almost totally terminated due to staggering volumes of oil illegally
smuggled out of the republic, which reached around
700,000 tons/year. During the first 5 months of 1999,
Chechnya produced only 96,000 tons of oil. The drop
in oil income largely contributed to the chaotic and
anarchic situation in Chechnya in the late-1990s.
Besides oil, an important source of money was
criminal activity, ranging from stealing federal aid to
taking hostages for ransom and even slave trade. Drug
trafficking also played an important role. Drugs were
often being received as a form of “financial support”
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from the Taliban and were later sold in the Russian
territory for cash. In 1998, the Chechens constituted
33 percent90 among the ethnic groups in Russia most
active in drug trafficking.
As the Chechen leadership was unable to maintain
even the most basic forms of authority outside the city
centers, Islamic radicals began establishing their own
writ in rural, mountainous regions under the religious
guidelines set by radical Islam and Sharia law. The
Chechen “official” secessionist forces were underfunded, undermanned, and demoralized.
One partnership that helped to boost radical Islam
in North Caucasus during this period was the relationship between the Chechen guerilla commander
and the emerging military leader of the Islamist movement Shamil Basayev, and a Salafi emissary and Saudi
citizen known by the nom de guerre, Ibn al-Khattab.91
The two developed a plan and launched a campaign
to unite Chechnya with the North Caucasian republic
of Dagestan to the east.92 Many other radical Islamists
from around the Middle East and the Balkans also
flocked to Chechnya. Cornell notes how the Bosnian
Islamists who emigrated from the Balkans after the
implementation of the Dayton Accords found a new
jihad theater for an Islamist Caliphate—this time in
the mountains of the Caucasus.93
During the interwar period, “slave trade” in
Chechnya flourished.94 In fact, it was rather a market
where hostages were bought and sold for ransom or in
anticipation of such. This trade served as an important
source of income for the separatists. The rebels did not
limit the kidnappings to Chechnya, and victims were
often smuggled in from neighboring Dagestan, as well
as Moscow, Saint Petersburg, and other Russian cities.
They would be held in Chechnya until ransom was re-
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ceived. In some cases, hostages were kept in the cities
where they were captured, but this fact became known
to the relatives only after they had paid the ransom.
One of the most prominent hostage takers and
slave traders was Arbi Barayev. He was also among
the cruelest terrorists.95 Before joining the separatist
movement in 1991, Barayev served in the local traffic
police. In 1995, he became a leader of the self-defense
militia in the village of Alkhan-Kala to later become
the commander of the “special Islamic battalion” and
a Chechen separatist general. As a slave trader, he is
known for having taken hostage a group of NTV journalists in 1997, when this practice started becoming a
common occurrence in Chechnya. He also started kidnapping rich Chechens, instead of Russian soldiers,
which distinguished him from those who focused on
victims from outside of Chechnya.96 Barayev was, by
far, not the only slave trader. Other known separatist
leaders, such as Shamil Basayev, were also involved in
hostage taking and slave trade.
In 2005, a Russian television channel NTV released
a documentary called “Open-Hearted Confession—
Prisoners of the Caucasus.”97 Based on interviews
with former victims, this documentary describes the
selection of victims, methods of blackmailing their relatives, and sizes of the ransoms. The slave traders did
not kidnap random victims, but focused on wealthy
individuals such as children of rich parents, journalists, and foreigners. After the hostages were captured,
the process of blackmailing was similar to what we
see in movies. The terrorists sent the relatives of the
victim a videotape where he or she is begging them
for help. As a sign that the terrorists should be taken
seriously, they often cut their victims’ fingers while
capturing the entire scene on camera. If the ransom
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was not paid, the victims often spent up to a year (and
sometimes even more) in captivity before, in many
cases, being found and freed by the Russians. Most of
the time the ransoms ranged from $3,000 to $20,000.98
The NTV documentary mentions amounts as high as
$70,000 in one case and allegedly as much as $500,000
in another. During the period of 1993–2005, 912 hostages were taken in Dagestan, of which 868 were
successfully freed by the Russian forces. According
to Vyacheslav Izmaylov, a war journalist, overall
around 1,500 hostages were freed, but many more
were taken.99
In 1996–99, Chechnya boasted a totally “legal” arms
market, situated in the central Grozny marketplace.
At this open-air suk, a Kalashnikov automatic could
be bought for around $200–$300 and a Makarov pistol
for around $600. A grenade cost 30 rubles.100 However,
weapons also were flowing in from abroad, and more
importantly, they came with foreign instructors.
The radical Islamist recruiters found many Chechen recruits among the young war veterans and unemployed who found little hope in a brighter future in the
de facto independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria,
where many converted to the Salafi-Wahhabi radical
ideology. As the radicals attempt to deny and reject
ethnic identity, the recruits reduced their allegiance
to Chechen or other Caucasian ethnic identity—as
do global Islamists operating from the Philippines
and Thailand to Afghanistan to East Africa and the
Magreb (North Africa). Much of the new radicalized
forces congregated in southeastern Chechnya near
the border with Dagestan and with the Republic of
Georgia. They were strategically located in this area
because it would be the staging zone for an invasion
of Dagestan on August 7, 1999, in an attempt to unite
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Chechnya and Dagestan into an Islamic Caliphate—
a religious-military dictatorship ruled by Sharia law.
Basayev and Ibn al-Khattab recruited the fighters
necessary to invade from the same area where they
established the “Islamic brigade.”101 However, war fatigue after the previous conflict with Russia, rejection
of radicalization by large parts of the population, and
internal divisions within the Chechen government
would make fighting the Russians for the second time
far more difficult.102
THE SECOND CHECHNYAN WAR
When Yeltsin’s handpicked successor, Vladimir
Putin, became Prime Minister in the summer of 1999,
he was a fierce proponent of forcibly bringing Chechnya under undisputed Russian control. This stance
secured him the support of the Russian military as
Putin solidified his power during the early period of
his presidency.
To justify their case for a war, Putin and his colleagues pointed out that the conflict in North Caucasus has evolved from an internal, separatist insurgency—in which the world mostly refrained from
interference or was sympathetic to the rebels—to a
struggle against radical Islamism, in which the world
should stand with Russia. In addition, Russia began
its public-relations campaign to convince its citizens
and foreign powers that Chechens and other Muslim
Caucasian terrorists were an existential threat to all
Russian civilians. Moscow started claiming, not without reason, that the conflict in the North Caucasus was
no longer a local fight for national liberation by the
“freedom-loving Chechens” but a terrorist threat to
Russians and other ethnic groups.103
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Unlike the First Chechen War, in which Russia had
made the first move, the Second Chechen War started
in August 1999, after terrorist forces led by Shamil Basayev invaded Dagestan from Chechnya in an attempt
to unite the two republics. The vision, articulated by
al-Qaeda’s number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was to
connect Afghanistan with North Caucasus through a
Caspian Sea “bridge.” Putin and the Russian military
responded with similar overwhelming force similar to
that seen in the first war.104 Devastation, displacement,
and civilian deaths were again staggering.
Exact official data on civilian casualties during the
Chechen wars are not available. Estimated numbers
of victims are based mostly on assessments by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), but the numbers vary considerably. A conservative estimate of the
number of civilian casualties in Grozny alone during
the first war is between 25,000 and 29,000.105 Various
Russian officials provided wide-ranging estimates of
casualties. For instance, then Russian Interior Minister
Anatoly Kulikov claimed that the number of civilians
who lost their lives was below 20,000.106 Conversely,
Sergey Kovalyov’s estimate is around 50,000, and General Aleksander Lebed spoke about 80,000–100,000
civilians killed. According to Taus Dzhabrailov, the
head of the Chechnya National Council in the mid2000s, 150,000 to 160,000 people are believed to have
died as a result of both Chechen wars, out of whom
75,000 were Chechen civilians.107
After the start of the Second Chechen War,
Maskhadov filed a suit against Kadyrov in the Sharia
court for engaging in negotiations with Prime Minister Putin.108 Kadyrov was sentenced to death and removed from the post of the Mufti.109 This led Kadyrov
to use his support from the Kremlin to hunt down
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Maskhadov. During a special operation of the Russian
Federal Security Service (FSB) in 2005, Maskhadov
was allegedly shot dead by his bodyguard in order to
avoid being taken prisoner.110 Kadyrov himself left the
post of the Mufti after he was appointed the new head
of Chechnya in June 2000. In August 2000, Akhmathadji Shamayev was appointed the Mufti by a congress of the imams of Chechnya.111
During the Second Chechen War, Russian forces
crushed the radical Islamic faction and retook control
of Chechnya, thus ending its de facto independence.
Many of the Chechen leaders were killed in battle.
Former President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev was assassinated on February 13, 2004, by a car explosion in
Doha, Qatar. Two Russian diplomats were accused of
his murder and sentenced to 25 years in a Qatari prison, but after serving 9 months they were transferred
to Russia.112 The Russian Ministry of Justice declined
to disclose where they are serving the rest of their
prison term, which suggests that they were silently
released.113 Maskhadov was killed on May 8, 2005,
during a special operation of the FSB, and Basayev
was killed on July 10, 2006, also during a Russian
special operation.
In the Second Chechen War, Russia was much
more effective in using ethnic Chechen units and intelligence sources against the separatists.114 Many of
them were rather opportunistic “pro-Russian” formations; nevertheless, they greatly contributed to the
Russian victory. Their cooperation allowed Moscow
to stop negotiating with the separatists and their leaders, and transform the conflict as a whole.
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Information Warfare Aspect of the Conflict.
Russia’s ability to use propaganda to change the
perception of the war in the Caucasus proved crucial
in helping it not only regain control of the region, but
also convince Russian citizens and the international
community that the policies toward the Caucasus
were the right ones at the right time. This was in a
striking contrast with the hapless course that brought
about the defeat and the inglorious Khasavyurt accords of 1996. Information management became an
important aspect of the conflict. Russia, with the help
of government-controlled media (especially TV channels), tried to censor the war crimes committed by the
security and military forces during and after the active
phase of the conflict, and attempted to portray this war
as a fight for Russian sovereignty. Russian media also
spun the hostilities and the struggle between Chechen
factions—the radical Islamists and terrorists—and
the legitimate Chechen nationalists fighters led by
the Kadyrovs.
The federal forces prepared for the Second Chechen War better than they did for the first one. While
Basayev and his bands were still in Dagestan, the
leadership of the federal forces chose a strategy which
used artillery and bombing raids first, followed by infantry assaults.115 This tactic turned out to be a success
and led to relatively small losses among the Russian
forces. Heavy Russian bombardment demoralized the
rebels, and Basayev was forced to flee from Dagestan
back to Chechnya. In Chechnya, the Russians tried to
minimize the need for armed conflict. At first, they
held talks with village elders and gave them a chance
to persuade the rebels to voluntarily leave their villages. If the rebels agreed and if no one in the village

43

opened fire on the federal forces, the Russians would
not fire at the civilians.
The leadership of the federal forces anticipated
that the rebels would leave the besieged Grozny voluntarily as well.116 These expectations did not come
true, and Russian military stormed Grozny. The air
force conducted heavy aerial attacks using Su-24 and
Su-25 fighters and helicopters. The pilots had to operate under air-defense missile fire from the Chechen
radicals. Just as in the First Chechen War, the rebels
used mainly Strela of various modifications, Igla, and
some Stinger portable air defense systems.117
Similar to the first Chechen campaign, Russian soldiers taking Grozny in 1999–2000 were not sufficiently
trained for urban warfare.118 Besides poor preparation,
the operations also suffered from flawed coordination
between the Russian uniformed military and the country’s internal troops under the Ministry of Interior,
which also took part in the attack. After the Russians
recaptured Grozny in 2000, the fighting moved deep
into the Chechen territory. The rebels fled into their
mountain bases located in caves, and the mountainous warfare made the situation more difficult for the
Russians. The federal forces decided to engage attack
planes and thermobaric (including fuel-air) weapons
against the rebels hiding in the mountainous terrain.119
The main thermobaric delivery system the Russians
used in Grozny was the “Buratino” (TOS-1),120 a system with a maximum effective range of 3.5 kilometers
and a 200 x 400 meter zone of ensured destruction. Another thermobaric system reportedly used in Chechnya was a shoulder-launched rocket similar to RPG
called RPO-A Schmel. This system has a maximum
effective range of 600 meters, and a 50-square-meter
zone of destruction in the open.
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Indigenous political leadership was more important in Chechnya than the immediate military victory. Among the pro-Russian Chechen leaders was
Mufti Ahmad Kadyrov, who formerly fought with
Dudayev in the First Chechen War, but then clashed
with Maskhadov. Kadyrov became the head of the
pro-Moscow government in Grozny established after
the end of formal hostilities in 2000. He had Moscow’s
blessing to do whatever was needed to maintain the
supremacy of Russian rule in the republic. When the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks gave credibility
to Putin’s policy toward the radicals in the Caucasus,
Russia not only managed to regain control of lost territory in Chechnya but also, to some extent, win the
propaganda war against the radicalized Chechen factions and foreign fighters.
Chechen rebels, who self-identified as Islamists
(Salafis-Wahhabis), allowed Russia to utilize the
traditional Sufi allegiance of the Chechens to build
pro-Russian fighting forces, who had superior local
knowledge and high level of motivation, rather than
solely using the conventional Russian military. However, even though Russia declared the second war
over in 2004, that year marked the beginning of the
fight between Russia and the pro-Russian Chechen
government against radical Islamists in the Northern
Caucasus, with the hostilities expanding throughout
the region and spilling over to all of Russia.
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GROWTH OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY
AND RADICALISM IN THE
NORTHERN CAUCASUS SINCE THE
SECOND CHECHEN WAR
The end of the active phase of the Second Chechen
War in 2000 did not bring an end to modern political Islam and Islamist terrorism on the Russian territory. The terrorist factions that threaten Russia and
have reached as far as Boston in 2013 have roots in the
Chechen wars as well as in the global jihadi movement,
as the Tsarnaev brothers’ website demonstrated. In
addition, global Islamist factions striving for seizure
of political control in Muslim lands and eventual creation of the Califate, such as the Muslim Brotherhood
and Hizb-ut-Tahrir al Islami (Islamic Army of Liberation), decided to commit more resources to Russia
when they saw the successes of the Islamist fighters in
North Caucasus.
Having been defeated on the battlefield, Basayev
turned his attention to attacking soft targets outside
Chechnya and Dagestan, not for any tactical gain
against the Russian military but for the terroristic,
traumatizing value of such acts. Meanwhile, within
much of Chechnya and neighboring republics, radicals, domestic and foreign, began expanding the terrorist network by establishing Salafi jamaats (communities) throughout the region. They took advantage of
the unique geography and the desperate socio-economic conditions that helped to recruit many young
locals to commit to their radical movement. Many,
therefore, joined the Islamist groups and moved away
to isolated areas, escaping the authorities’ writ and solidifying their commitment to increase their influence
and plan attacks.121
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Moreover, Islamist leaders like Basayev and, later,
Doku Umarov, began outlining jihadist manifestos
that definitively declared their desire to transform
North Caucasus into a Caliphate and a vehicle of the
pan-Islamist fundamentalist force fighting against
Russians not just for independence but for global jihad.122 The radicals began with the implementation of
Sharia law throughout the former Chechen Republic
of Ichkeria and in the Salafi jamaats, over which their
followers had influence outside of Chechnya. After
Dudayev was killed and Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev became acting president of Ichkeria in April 1996, the
process accelerated.123
As in other Muslim societies, Sharia law is perceived as God-given and thus paramount over laws or
doctrines coming from civil or common law systems,
such as parliamentary legislation and precedent-based
law. According to the traditionalist interpretations of
the Koran and other Islamic holy scriptures, Sharia
law is not open to interpretation or amendment by
secular scholars. This legal doctrine contrasts with the
traditional Chechen and Caucasian attitudes toward
Islam, as many in the region are devout Muslims, but
have preferred to follow Sufi Islam, which accepts the
following of Sufi saints and cultural icons that make
up the separate religious and cultural identities of the
Caucasian peoples.124 The radicals, on the other hand,
adhere to the militant monotheistic principle of tawhid in which the worshiping or praying to any entity
besides Allah—even to Muhammad himself —is sacrilegious.125 Throughout the world, Salafi followers of
the tawhid often destroy graves of venerated saints,
forbid any local worship, including that of ancestors,
and are generally much more intolerant than the Sufis.
Having established Sharia law, the radicals needed to
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implement doctrines in order to “purify” the region
from kafirs (infidels), who do not practice Islam in accordance to their dogma.
After the assassination of Basayev in 2006 by the
Russian Special Forces, the new head of the Caucasusbased Islamist movement, Doku Umarov, established
the Caucasus Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz, or CE) based on
Sharia law and with goals consistent with fundamentalist Wahabbist-Salafist teachings of Islam.126 This
restatement of Umarov’s militant Islamist ideology is
important to understand the radical direction in which
the North Caucasus insurgency is moving.
CE’s initial manifesto declared its objective to unite
all of the Northern Caucasus into a single “Caucasus
Emirate,” eliminating all the borders separating autonomous republics and all ethnic, linguistic, and cultural distinctions as un-Islamic. The whole region was
supposed to become one frontline of the global jihad
in the name of Allah and against the infidels. In order to achieve this goal, the Islamists needed to force
Russia to relinquish its control over the region, as has
been the demand among separatists for centuries.
The extremists also seek to force the various republics
and ethnic groups to renounce any indigenous identity, that has been cherished and valued, and submit
completely to radical Islamist ideology and command,
including the “Amir” Umarov, and join global jihad.
Once achieving total control, Umarov and CE would
begin to spread their war to the Muslim areas in the
Urals, Central Asia, and Siberia, with future plans to
conquer all of Russia, including Moscow.127
The CE became an Islamist affiliate of the global
al-Qaeda-led movement that operated symbiotically with terrorist cells all across the Middle East and
Eurasia. CE and other Northern Caucasus radicals
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received tactical, financial, and moral support from
al-Qaeda and its partners.128 For example, Caucasian
terrorists benefited from the expertise of al-Qaeda
operatives Muhammad al Emirati and Abdulla Kurd,
who helped organize operational activities within the
region while coordinating with al-Qaeda globally.
Though Russian counterterrorist forces killed both
of them in April 2011, they advanced CE’s mission
to connect with global jihad.129 Beyond this relationship, al-Qaeda’s tentacles in the region go back to the
1990s, even before the paradigm of Caucasian rebellion against Russia changed to jihadist. Hahn documents the many instances of al-Qaeda contributing
arms, funds, Islamist education, and access to training camps in Afghanistan and elsewhere, for fighters
from the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Al-Qaeda’s
Ayman al-Zawahiri once stated that the North Caucasus represented “one of three primary fronts in the
war against the West,” and CE’s actions attempted to
match his rhetoric.130
The Second Terror Campaign.
With the help of foreign jihadi organizations and
the infusion of new recruits and radical immigrants
from the Balkans, the year 2000 marked the beginning
of a new Islamist terrorist campaign against the Russian population, striking targets as far as Moscow.
This was a startling development in comparison with
the wars between Russia and Chechnya, as conflicts
had remained contained within the Caucasus. The
first known case of terrorism as a tactical as well as a
psychological weapon was during the First Chechen
War in 1995, when Basayev executed a large suicide
bombing of Russian forces in Chechnya.
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Coinciding with the beginning of the second
Chechen war, however, Chechen Islamist fighters led
by Basayev focused on attacking Russian civilians.
The earliest major attack was the 2002 Dubrovka Theater siege in Moscow in which 912 people were taken
hostage.131 Russian forces killed all the terrorists, but
around 130 hostages perished with the terrorists. This
Russian anti-terrorist operation is considered by many
to be a failure of the special services. In 2006, the survivors and relatives of the victims prepared a 200-page
report called “Nord-Ost—An Unfinished Investigation,” in which they claim that the special services did
not do everything they could to save as many people
as possible, and accused them of negligence.132 The
most controversial aspect of the operation was the usage of a new type of nerve gas, which is believed to be
responsible for the deaths of the terrorists and the 130
hostages. It appears that the authorities did not deploy medical teams near the Dubrovka Theater, amass
ambulances before storming the target, or brief the
medical personnel on the nerve agent use and ways to
treat the patients. While hardly a surprise, given the
poor state of Russian military medicine and the health
system in general, this was a failure of emergency
medicine of enormous proportions.
There have been numerous demands to release the
information about the gas, the composition of which
continues to remain secret.133 However, Aleksey Filatov, a former Alpha special forces unit fighter, justified using the gas by claiming that, because the gas
was used, the terrorists failed to detonate the bomb
they had with them, in which case the number of casualties would have significantly exceeded the number
of those killed by the gas.134
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Several years earlier in September 1999, a series
of apartment bombings shattered the peace in Russia.135 Four apartment buildings were blown up in
cities across Russia: two of them in Moscow, one in
Buynaksk (Dagestan), and one in Volgodonsk (Rostovskaya Oblast’). Around 300 people lost their lives,
and many more were wounded. The terrorist attacks
are believed to have been committed by separatists
from North Caucasus as an act of revenge for Moscow’s military operations in Chechnya and Dagestan.
There are many, however, who challenge the veracity
of this version of events.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, Basayev
and Umarov perpetrated a series of terrorist attacks
across Russia. The most notable examples are the attacks on a school in Beslan in 2004, the Saint Petersburg-Moscow passenger train in late-2009, the Moscow metro in 2010, and on Domodedovo Airport in
Moscow in January 2011. The U.S. Department of
State and the United Nations (UN) recognized these
attacks as committed by Chechen terrorists, seeking to
establish the Caucasus Emirate.136
On September 1, 2004, a group of 17 terrorists took
around 1,100-1,400 people hostage in an elementary
school in the town of Beslan in North Ossetia.137 The
FSB-led operation to release the hostages remains controversial. On September 3, the FSB forces undertook
a counterattack, which resulted in a chaotic exchange
of fire between them and the terrorists.138 The efforts
of the FSB and the supporting troops suffered from a
lack of coordination and were further complicated by
many armed civilians voluntarily trying to help free
the hostages. One of the reasons for the poor coordination is allegedly the fact that the FSB forces expected
only 354 hostages to be in the school, which resulted in
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choosing a wrong strategy for the attack.139Also, they
did not set a perimeter, which initially prevented FSB
forces from sealing the school and later allowed some
of the terrorists to escape. As a result of the operation,
335 hostages were killed. How many hostages died at
the hands of the terrorists, how many as a result of
the FSB using heavy weaponry, and how many due
to the mistakes of the rescue team remains unclear.140
If the Russian military and security forces conducted
a “lessons learned” investigation, it remains hidden
from the public.
In the Northern Caucasus, CE and other radicals
continued their guerrilla war against Russian forces
at a staggering pace that earned Russia the dubious
distinction of having one of the highest rates of terrorist attacks per year in the world.141 In effect, over
the past decade, the North Caucasus has become
an ungovernable area and a part of the global jihad
space. Local Islamist organizations are now capable
of launching their own operations with some level of
cooperation with global terrorist networks, as arrests
in Europe and the Boston attack have demonstrated.
More intelligence activities will be necessary to better
understand the multiple facets of this cooperation.
Russian Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency
in the 21st Century.
Russia’s porous borders and insufficient surveillance throughout the region; inadequate local knowledge of the counterintelligence forces assigned to
North Caucasus from around the country; a lack of
linguistic skills by the regular military as well as special forces; and corruption of the local authorities and
economic development programs severely affected
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Russian anti-terrorist and counterinsurgency responses. North Caucasus, in addition to terrorism and
Islamism, has become a hotspot of drug and human
trafficking that further funded terrorist activities and
solidified the relationships between the Caucasus and
drug havens of Afghanistan and Tajikistan and other
global trafficking networks. Chechen and other North
Caucasus networks have become significant narcotics distribution platforms for Russia and Eastern and
Western Europe.
Doku Umarov’s Caucasian Emirate has become a
formidable coalition of various decentralized jamaats
that, despite Russian efforts so far, has avoided having its network substantially exposed and liquidated.
Just like Islamist radicals elsewhere, CE members have
successfully hidden from scrutiny and entrenched
themselves in order to continue operations. They have
managed to transform much of their historic grand
strategy of regional guerilla warfare aimed at achieving independence from Russia—into one that includes
underground tactics and urban warfare, while invoking radical ideology that had little connection with the
history of the region. However, given the enormity
of the international jihadi goals, it is too early to tell
whether CE will manage to achieve its objectives domestically and regionally, and whether its comradesin-arms would succeed globally.
RUSSIAN COUNTERTERRORIST
AND COUNTERINSURGENCY RESPONSES
AND STRATEGIES SINCE 2000
After the successful recapture of Dagestan and
Chechnya by Russia in 2000, Russian military and interior ministry units in North Caucasus have become
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primarily a counterterrorist force. However, they lack
appropriate training, equipment, and motivation.
With Putin ascending to the presidency in the same
year, Russian counterterrorist operations maintained
“search and destroy” tactics to stop the growth of radical Islam in the Northern Caucasus. Yet, since 2000,
Moscow and Grozny have not fully eliminated the terrorist threat in the North Caucasus. As Sergey Markedonov from the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) notes, the main failure of the Russian
counterinsurgency in the North Caucasus was the absence of a relevant, well thought out and coherently
implemented strategy. Practically all operations, even
the successful ones, look like belated responses.
Another problem is the correct identification of
the enemy. Russian officials, including at the highest
level, tend to refer to the separatists as terrorists or
“bandits.”142 However, terrorism is not criminal activity; it is political violence, Markedonov says.143 Thus it
is necessary to understand the ideological roots of the
current Caucasian terrorists and their political goals.
Since the late-1990s, terrorism under nationalist and
self-determination slogans has been replaced by an
Islamic one. However, even today Russian officials
continue to speak about the “Chechen separatists.”144
Meanwhile, the situation in the North Caucasus no
longer resembles the dynamics of the Chechen conflict. The insurgency in the region is not centered in
Chechnya anymore. Rather, every year since 2005, the
recorded incidence of violence in Chechnya has been
less than, or equal to, the levels of violence observed
in the neighboring republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan. Ideologically, the Russian government does not
propose any attractive alternatives to militant Islam.
Instead, it is restricting its policy by supporting the
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state-sponsored Spiritual Board of Muslims (Dukhovnye Upravleniya Musul’man, or DUMs), while underestimating the role of unofficial Muslims who are
not subordinated to DUMs and not engaged in the terrorist activity and jihadist propaganda.
Russian intelligence, counterterrorism, and strategic communities at times developed and implemented
policies that were actually causing radical Islam to
grow in the region. Outside their military and intelligence networks, Moscow has mainly relied on the
subsidiary government in Chechnya led by, first, Mufti Ahmad Kadyrov, and after his death in the bombing
during the celebration of the Russian V-E day on May
9, 2004, by his son, Ramzan.145 Kadyrov the younger
managed to bring the violence in the republic under
control. However, he has a dubious human rights record, ranging from alleged killings of prominent Russian journalists who openly criticized his practices,
to hunting down and killing his opponents abroad.
A notable case of such killing is the assassination
of Umar Israilov in Vienna, Austria, on January 30,
2009.146 Israilov was a former bodyguard of Kadyrov,
but later turned into an open critic of Kadyrov’s regime in Chechnya and fled to Austria, where he was
given asylum.
The dynamics of Chechen society have, so far,
worked to Kadyrov and Moscow’s advantage, because most of the Chechens still want to identify as being loyal to the Vaynach (Chechen) nation, rather than
to adopt radical Islam and erase their discrete identity. Kadyrov has had a great impact on local society
through repression of terrorist activity and promoting
the “Chechen national identity,” which coexists and
complements, not supplants, religious practices.
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Through Chechen efforts and Russian subsidies,
Grozny and other cities underwent massive postwar reconstruction and development that included
constructing the Grozny Central Mosque, the largest mosque in Europe, Russia, and Eurasia, and one
of the largest in the world, apparently with Turkish
funding.147 This was done in order to further develop
Chechen culture and traditional Sufi Islam and as
an attempt to supplant the appeal of radical,
global Islam.148
In what could be seen as an improvement in Russian-Chechen relations, the promotion of Chechen culture by the Kadyrov regime after the Second Chechen
War is one of the few policy planks on which Russian
and Chechen leaderships have actively collaborated.
In order to further promote the government’s version
of Chechen society over the radical ideology and to
increase his own popularity, Kadyrov legalized polygamy (even though it is illegal under Russian law
and the constitution).149 What Kadyrov did in the hope
of improving the situation in Chechnya and decreasing the influence of radical Islamists in the area, with
the blessing from Moscow, appears to have been more
effective than Moscow’s actions.150
The fact that the current Russian counterinsurgency strategy is far from being fully successful is
demonstrated by many news accounts detailing the
ongoing violence in the region. As recently as June 23,
2013, 38 special police officers were killed in clashes
in southwestern Chechnya.151 Another two police
officers were killed in the Shatoy district on June 29.
Aleksey Malashenko, co-chair of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Religion, Society, and Security Program,
believes that the Kremlin did not learn any political
lessons from the two Chechen campaigns.152 He notes
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that “the Kremlin has no productive strategy in North
Caucasus; its policy toward the region is mostly reactive.” Another drawback of the policy of the Kremlin,
Malashenko believes, is that it is not able to prevent
the emergence of a new generation of mujahedeen.
Effective measures against their rise would inevitably
have to include a dialogue with the opposition and
undertaking practical measures to combat the ubiquitous corruption in the region—something that the
current elites are unwilling and unlikely to do.153
International Criticism of Russia
and the Kadyrov Government.
International observers from the UN, OSCE, the
United States, and from human rights organizations,
have criticized the Government of Russia and Kadyrov’s Chechen Republic for anti-terrorist activities
that violate human rights and the laws of war. The
U.S. Congress has stated that Chechen governmental
forces are emulating the abusive tactics of the terrorists.154 The United States is under pressure to freeze
Kadyrov’s bank accounts in response to these condemnations.155 Reportedly, Kadyrov’s name is in the
classified section of the Magnitsky List, the U.S. law
named after a Russian anti-corruption whistle blower who died in a Moscow prison awaiting trial, and
that targets gross violators of human rights.156 However, despite the overwhelming use of force, many in
Chechnya seem to have accepted the Kadyrov rule
as “the lesser of two evils” between the available options, despite the fact that Kadyrov apparently has
violated many Russian laws and may be guilty of
serious crimes.
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For now, Chechnya is no longer in an all-out war
with Russia. Despite high unemployment, it is emerging from a debilitating economic depression. As long
as Kadyrov maintains this modicum of security and
income for the population, the Chechens will not risk
altering the situation radically by combating Russia or
swelling the ranks of the Islamists. They live with Putin and Kadyrov for now—but as in the past, this may
change quickly.157
Russia, for its part, uses conventional, counterterrorist forces and soft-power means like economic aid,
subsidies, and development schemes in order to help
sustain a pro-Moscow government facing an Islamist
threat. With the Kadyrov government becoming more
entrenched, Putin’s Kremlin has been willing to live
with a manufactured Chechen-nationalist narrative
that uses Chechen history and tradition in order to
simulate a “rebirth” of Chechen national pride; however, this “renaissance” has become more of a makeshift 21st-century post-modern artifact sustained and
regulated by Grozny and Moscow. For now, it has
been effective in striking a balance between de facto
independence short of the trappings of sovereignty,
such as full border control, foreign relations, and formally independent armed forces. Moscow and Grozny, too, consider this the lesser of two evils.
Yet, the renaissance comes at a price. There are
reports that Kadyrov is allowed to control a good
portion of the lucrative real estate market in Moscow. This combination of strong-arm tactics, lucrative
business ventures, and criminality helps to keep the
Kadyrov regime under Kremlin’s control, while maintaining Moscow’s domination over the region by being Kadyrov’s de facto banker and protector. Thanks
to Moscow’s strategic financial injections, Kadyrov
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has overseen the rebuilding and development of city
blocks, shopping centers, and other major construction projects, including support of the faith. In order
to promote further the “state-compatible” form of
Islam, Kadyrov has been financing Chechens’ flights
to Mecca for Hajj, one of the five obligatory Islamic
pillars of faith.158
One of the reasons why the Chechen people continue to join the insurgency and become followers
of radical Islamic ideologies is the long-term lack of
opportunities and gloomy prospects for the future.
Despite the heavy financial support from the Russian federal budget, Chechnya is the second poorest
subject of the Russian Federation in terms of gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita after Ingushetia,
with approximate GDP per capita of $1,850 in 2010.159
Chechnya has levels of unemployment that are unsustainably high for a self-sufficient economy. The official
unemployment level in late-2012 was 25.3 percent.160
However, according to Russian media sources, the
real Chechen unemployment is as high as 70 percent,
with youth unemployment being even higher.161 The
high unemployment rates and low salaries of those
who are lucky enough to be employed reflect the lack
of prospects and opportunities, especially for young
people. One may think that with over 90 percent of
Chechnya’s budget bankrolled by Moscow, Kadyrov’s
government can only create and execute policy that
has the blessing from the Kremlin in order to preserve
the still tenuous tranquility.162 However, Moscow itself is a hostage of sorts in Chechnya, as no one today
is seen as capable of replacing Kadyrov.
Meanwhile, Chechen refugees in Europe are gradually organizing themselves and forming a well-established diaspora. The largest Chechen diaspora is in
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Western European countries, such as Norway, France,
Belgium, Germany, and Austria, and made up of an
estimated 10,000 to 30,000 people in each of those
countries.163 The Caucasus Times claims that this newly
formed Chechen diaspora is able to exert influence on
the situation in Chechnya.164
There are several organizations in the Chechen diaspora. For instance, the World Chechen Congress is registered as an NGO in Belgium.165 Another organization
is the Chechen Diaspora of Norway.166Additionally,
in September 2010, a “virtual” World Chechen Congress took place in Poland, which was a controversial
event evoking negative reactions among anti-Kremlin
Chechens.167 For instance, Zhalodi Saralyapov, speaker
of the so-called Parliament of the “Chechen Republic
of Ichkeria,” said that these actions “are aimed at destabilizing the situation in the Chechen national liberation movement, at the destruction of positive developments acquired during the long war.”168 Members
of the Chechen diaspora in countries all across Europe
distanced themselves from the congress, stating that it
was organized by Russians in order to consolidate the
Russian occupation of Chechnya.
The members of the Chechen diaspora are not
united. A majority of Chechen refugees may be supportive of the Islamist outlook, saying that they want
to see the fight for independence continue (66 percent)
and that they have a positive attitude toward establishing a single North Caucasus republic (54 percent).
There is also a small group who are pro-Kadyrov in
their views.169 These people actively promote the ideas
of a common state with Russia.
Under the Dmitry Medvedev administration
(2009-12), in order to promote a “softer” approach to
exerting Moscow’s power over the region, the Kremlin
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has created the Northern-Caucasian Federal District
and Northern-Caucasian Economic District. Alexander Khloponin, the Kremlin-appointed “GovernorGeneral” of the Northern-Caucasian Federal District,
has outlined the District’s broad goals and individual
projects. Khloponin announced that by 2020 the region will be part of a transportation network that will
link the North Caucasus with the rest of Russia, the
Middle East, and Central Asia. He has proposed various projects, including road infrastructure, building
holiday resorts, improving regional access to higher
education, making airport renovations, and constructing hydroelectric plants across the entire North Caucasus.170 Recent investigations of the resorts scheme
suggest that a good part of these projects were means
to illicitly syphon off budgetary funds into the private
pockets of “favored” businessmen who are particularly close to the powers that be.171
The same can be alleged about the Sochi Winter
Olympics in 2014. The Russian Ministry of Regional
Development announced in 2010 (almost 4 years before the games) that the expenses for preparing for the
Olympics had already surpassed $30 billion.172 Other
sources claim that the Sochi “subtropical” Winter
Olympics will cost $50 billion. In comparison, the cost
of the last Winter Olympics in Vancouver in 2010 is
estimated to have been between $3.6 and $6 billion.173
According to Boris Nemtsov, the former Russian First
Deputy Prime Minister and a leader of the Russian opposition banned from the Duma, the overall amount
of embezzlement at the Sochi Olympics has already
reached about $25–$30 billion.174 He believes that the
total expenditures have already surpassed $50 billion,
which makes it the most expensive Winter Olympics
in human history.
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The responsibility of national security, however,
for Northern Caucasus, is a partnership between the
autonomous republic governments and the federal,
Moscow-based national security institutions. The national security apparatus within the federal government has indeed maintained the lead in intelligence,
reconnaissance, and support for what Putin tries to
portray as a solely “regional problem,” but which in
reality threatens the whole of Russia and beyond.
In 2006, Russia established the National Anti-Terrorism Committee, headed ex-officio by the Director
of the FSB, in order to bring various departments in
one silo, where counterterrorist policy could be better formulated and implemented more efficiently.175
Even with better coordination, however, violence and
death are still rampant throughout the North Caucasus. Pummeled by hostile media and public opinion,
Doku Umarov, the CE emir, has made a declaration
on behalf of CE in 2012 that terrorists under his command would “stop attacks against Russian civilians”
and, instead, focus their efforts on battling military,
police, government officials, or the security apparatus.176 The sincerity of Umarov’s declaration remains
uncertain: the statement may have been made just to
get better public relations, or in order to cajole Russians into moderating their assaults on CE and its
terrorist networks. His public affairs track record remains, unsurprisingly, spotty: in fact, Umarov allegedly announced his resignation on August 1, 2010,
due to poor health.177 The next day, however, Umarov released another video where he called his former
announcement faked.178 He also said that he was in
good health.
In fact, Umarov had assumed a less active role
in CE but retains the top leadership position in the
group, which signifies how decentralized the com62

mand structure in this terrorist network is, in sync
with other net-centric terrorist organizations around
the world.179 Rogue actors in the North Caucasus, real
or imagined, still attack civilians, defying Umarov’s
declaration. Moreover, the events in Belgium and Boston, where North Caucasus terrorists were arrested,
demonstrate that the world must not discount the
threat of Islamic radicalism in the North Caucasus to
European and American national security.
EFFECT OF NORTHERN CAUCASUS ON
BROADER RUSSIAN, AMERICAN,
AND GLOBAL SECURITY
With Islamist terrorist activities challenging Russia’s control in the North Caucasus, Moscow risks
having the insurgency undermine Russian strategic
goals of reestablishing itself as a leading global power.
With the advent of the 2014 Winter Olympic Games
and the 2018 Soccer World Cup in Russia, Putin and
the ruling elite are eager to use these and other Russian-hosted global events to improve the country’s image, attract global investment, and secure the world’s
confidence that Russia is a 21st-century global leader
akin to China, India, and Brazil. If one of those events
were to attacked, the consequences for Russia’s global
image would be extremely negative. While Umarov
pledged to attack Sochi in 2014, Putin has managed to
convince much of the world that the security problems
in the North Caucasus, in spite of sporadic attacks and
active terrorist cells, have been largely resolved.
The Long–term Rise in Radicalism.
Even though Russia made it through the Sochi
Olympics with no casualties, the fight is far from
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over. Other regions in the Northern Caucasus, especially Dagestan, are experiencing a rise in Islamic radicalism. The origins of contemporary Islamic radicalism in Dagestan go back to the early-1990s, when the
Soviet Union was collapsing and opening its borders
to the outside world.180 A key figure in organizing the
radical Islamist movement in Dagestan was Bagauddin Kebedov. He was a devout supporter of Salafism
and harshly criticized other, more moderate forms
of Islam, such as Sufism. In 1990, he became one of
the leaders of the Islamic Party of Revival and subsequently a leader of a radical wing of Dagestani Salafists, later named the Islamic Jamaat of Dagestan (IJD).
The Salafi ideology enjoyed wide support among the
population due to the deepening economic crisis, the
simplicity and understandability of the Salafi ideas,
and the spirit of brotherhood in the organization. The
IJD gradually became the most influential Salafi group
in Dagestan.
The protracted conflict in Chechnya was also one
of the reasons that facilitated the spreading of this radical ideology in Dagestan. The 1996 withdrawal from
Chechnya was a sign of Russian military weakness.
It encouraged the Dagestani radicals to form closer
ties with their brothers in faith. Many of them went
to fight in Chechnya or joined local terrorist organizations. In addition, the Chechen conflict encouraged
people who saw the war as a source of income to join
the radicals.
The antigovernment and anti-Russian sentiments
among the members of the IJD were encouraged by
the counterproductive policy of local Dagestani authorities. They lacked a cohesive strategy to contain
the IJD and instead chose to irritate it with police action. In particular, the local Dagestani authorities de-
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cided to launch what they considered to be a “total
war” against the radical extremist groups. However,
the ranks of Wahhabists were often filled by ordinary
Muslims with no previous ties to extremists. Moreover, the “hunt on Wahhabists” was frequently used
as a means to solve personal and political disputes,
and also for the personal benefits of corrupt law enforcement and petty politicians. Using excessively
harsh methods only motivated many Islamist activists
to seek revenge or to go fight in Chechnya.
In 2012, the situation in Dagestan became critical.181
Around three-quarters of all terrorist acts committed
in the North Caucasus for the first 9 months of 2012
took place in Dagestan. Despite the minimal chances
for success of their goal to establish an Islamic quasistate, the Salafists/Wahhabists enjoy considerable
support of the Dagestani population. Similarly to the
early-1990s, people continue to be dissatisfied with an
untenable economic situation, including unemployment, corruption, poor healthcare, and the lack of future prospects. However, the religious yearning and
its violent manifestation also attract Dagestanis into
the ranks of terrorists.
The situation in Ingushetia is similar to that in
Dagestan. The influence of Islamic radicals in Ingushetia remains high despite the regular killing and capturing of radical terrorists and field commanders.182
Salafi/Wahhabi ideology and organizations have a
strong potential for the same reasons as in Dagestan.
Moscow declared the counterterrorist operation in
Chechnya completed in 2009. However, this action allowed terrorist activity to spread more easily to the
neighboring republics, including Ingushetia.183 Terrorist attacks continue to take place. The ranks of Wahhabists continue to be filled mainly by Ingushetia’s
youth who do not see other ways of self-realization.
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Similarly, in Kabardino-Balkaria, the nationalism
of the local ethnic communities dominates over civil
values.184 However, radical Islamist terrorists are active in Kabardino-Balkaria. For instance, on January
6, 2013, three suspected terrorists were killed by the
Russian security services.185 They are believed to have
been preparing terrorist attacks against local churches
during the celebration of the Orthodox Christmas. At
least since 2009, the clashes between the rebels and the
Russian security services in the republic have been a
weekly, if not a more frequent, occurrence.186 There
are also reports that hundreds of Sunni fighters have
joined radical forces in Syria to fight the Alawi regime
of President Bashar el-Assad and his Shia allies, such
as Hezbollah and Iran.187 Russia no doubt applauds
the exodus of the troublemakers, despite its support
of the Assad regime: if killed or wounded in Syria,
these extremists are “off the streets” in the Caucasus.
Nevertheless, the Russian experts interviewed in
the course of this research agree that expectations of
a general massive uprising in the North Caucasus
against Moscow’s rule are not realistic. Local uprisings are possible in the event that local administrations commit political mistakes, giving the insurgents
an excuse to organize and act against the Kremlin.188
In addition, there are numerous disputes within the
region itself, such as interethnic tensions between the
Ossetians and the Ingush or land disputes between
different groups in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria,
let alone inter-republican border disputes (e.g., between North Ossetia and Ingushetia, and between Ingushetia and Chechnya).189 Other examples of tensions
include intra-Islamic disputes, such as those between
Sufi Muslims, who consider their tribal lands to be a
part of their ethno-national heritage, and the ultra-
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religious Salafis, who exhibit higher differing levels of
radicalism, and violent followers of global jihad.
The partial remedy to deprive the rebels of an excuse to lure new mujahedeen seems to be economic
and social development of the region; attractive secular policies; and the presence of a strong alternative
to the radical brand of Islam. If corruption and unemployment are successfully dealt with and if the youth
is given a viable and attractive alternative, the rebel
leaders will lose their appeal, and the whole insurgency movement may gradually fade.
Instead, Moscow is trying to discredit radical Islamism as something that is foreign to “traditional Islam” and Caucasian ethnic traditions—a strategy that
has so far had little effect. Paradoxically, this strategy
has been unsuccessful despite the fact that even unofficial Muslims, not subordinated to the state-sponsored
Islamic structures, are rather critical and suspicious of
the “Caucasus Emirate” activity.190 The local population in many cases fails to view federal institutions in
the region as legitimate. In the meantime, the North
Caucasus is gradually turning into a de facto “inner
abroad” for Moscow.
In order for Moscow to achieve successes in fighting the North Caucasian separatists, its policy needs
to include measures aimed at integrating at least some
of the radicals into the Russian society. In other words,
the resolve of the Kremlin to neutralize the separatists
at all costs needs to be combined with “soft power”
addressed to the citizens.191 Russia needs to be able
to distinguish a terrorist act from a gangland slaying
(very often the highest representatives of the Russian
state identify terrorists as “bandits”). These measures
must be accompanied by a relentless anticorruption
strategy (because “privatization” of the local power
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provokes social protest and radicalism), creation of
new personnel for the republican level of public service—(well-educated beyond the Caucasian republics)—and promotion of alternative versions of Islam
(regional Caucasus or European Islam for example).
Beyond the North Caucasus, the situation is slowly deteriorating. In particular, the Muslim-majority
republics of Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, which are
located in the core of Russia and far away from the
North Caucasus, have started to develop Islamist networks that are linked with the Northern Caucasus and
global networks. On July 19, 2012, Deputy Mufti Valiulla Yakupov was killed, and Ildus Fayzov, the Mufti
of Tatarstan, was severely injured in a car bombing
in Kazan, Tatarstan.192 These clergymen were openly
critical of the spread of Wahhabism in the country.193
Radicalized citizens of Tatarstan have also been gone
to fight in Chechnya and with the Taliban in Afghanistan.194 Also, in Bashkortostan in February 2011, Bashkir officials stated that four Islamist radicals operating
at the behest of Umarov were caught with a “homemade bomb” with the intention of inflicting mass
civilian casualties.195
Since North Caucasus is an energy hub adjacent
to the Black and Caspian Seas, the sabotage of energy
infrastructure remains a constant concern among Russian energy firms upstream and downstream. As Russia strives to connect new pipelines like South Stream
from Novorossiysk on the Black Sea to Turkey and
Europe and continues to build up Krasnodar Krai’s
ports as energy-logistics hubs, Islamist terrorists in
the North Caucasus will continue to focus on any opportunity to strike Russian energy trade and civilian
population in a devastating way.
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For the United States, the winding down of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq will change the U.S. focus on Central Asia and the Caucasus and its threat
assessment of North Caucasus terrorism. After the
withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan in
2014, the country will most likely slip back into chaos,
threatening the stability of the countries of Central
Asia and North Caucasus, which has traditional political, religious, and drug-trafficking ties with Afghanistan’s Taliban. Thus, the United States may be
required to refocus on the region, which has so far received insufficient attention under the Barack Obama
administration.
Terrorist networks from Russia will find new opportunities to undermine Russian and U.S. allies and
the peace that the United States fought so hard to secure. Past reports show that Russian citizens from the
Northern Caucasus have been active in combat and
in drug trafficking in Afghanistan and South Asia.196
North Caucasus terrorists also greatly benefited from
the drug trade originating from Afghanistan.197
After the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the
old ties are likely to revive. The global financing of
terrorism is vital to help grow the North Caucasus
Islamist network. The radical Islamists in the North
Caucasus continue to challenge Russian federal authorities, thanks to the availability of outside sources
of financing. As far back as 2000, Khattab and websites
supportive of al-Qaeda have solicited financial support
for North Caucasus groups, even before CE was established.198 Through the global “charity” called Benevolence International Foundation, set up in Saudi Arabia, Chechen groups received vast amounts of money
from the Middle East, before the international terrorism finance arm was shut down in Russia, the United
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States, and elsewhere.199 In 2010, a charity known as
“Sharia4Belgium,” which was sending money to CE,
was thwarted, as well as numerous websites based in
Europe that solicited and laundered funds that ultimately reached Islamic terrorist groups.200
Not only fraudulent “charities” in Europe were
exposed as money-laundering schemes for terrorists;
some North Caucasus cells have been uncovered in
Europe as well. In the Czech Republic, a cell associated with CE, containing one Chechen and a couple
of Dagestanis, among other Islamic radicals from
Eastern Europe, was apprehended in April 2011. The
French police found five Chechen nationals, including
an imam, in a cell which made and stored components
for making bombs.201 Based on the nature of these findings, North Caucasus terrorism in Europe appears to
target civilians and government officials regardless of
what declaration Umarov might produce.
Finally, as already mentioned, Chechens and other
extremist Sunni fighters from the North Caucasus
have made their way via Turkey to Syria fighting
for the Sunni rebels against the Alawi Assad regime.
Hundreds of Islamists from the North Caucasus, notably Chechnya, have joined the rebellion against Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, even as Kadyrov states
no Chechens are actively engaged in Syria.202 A senior
Azerbaijani official who requested anonymity estimated the number of North Caucasians fighting in Syria
against Assad to be in the “hundreds.” He complained
that Russia is not doing much to stop the migration of
its young men to fight a jihad in Syria because Russian authorities prefer “their” extremists to be killed
far away from its borders.203 On the other hand, if
trained and battle-hardened in Syria, these fighters
may come home and cause a lot of trouble to the pro-
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Moscow administrations of their homeland. As seen
in Europe, Syria, Afghanistan, and in North America
(Boston), the North Caucasian threat is already global
in nature, and active cooperation among international
intelligence and law enforcement organizations is
required in order to prevent this region from inflicting any more harm to American and international
interests.
OUTLOOK AND RECOMMENDATIONS
While Kadyrov and Putin continue to eviscerate
terrorists, their networks, and supporters, Russian
society as a whole has made little progress in establishing an interethnic harmony and inter-religious détente between the ethnic Russian Orthodox majority
and the Muslim North Caucasian peoples throughout
the country. The Russian elites and Slavic Orthodox
majority’s attitudes toward the Caucasus vary. Some
believe that Russia needs to stop pouring multibillion
dollar subsidies from the federal budget to the likes of
Kadyrov and to other Caucasus autonomous republics. Hence the famous slogan formulated by the opposition leader, Alexei Navalny: “Enough feeding the
Caucasus.”
Eventually, ethno-religious enmity and economic
disparity may lead to political independence of the regions or parts thereof. Many prominent establishment
figures, such as the former Prime Minister Yevgeny
Primakov, Chairman of the Accounts Chamber of
Russia and former Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin,
the head of Rosatom and the former Prime Minister
Sergey Kiriyenko, and the former Moscow mayor
Yury Luzhkov, essentially agree that Russia should
abandon the North Caucasus and build a new bor-
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der on the Terek River. Yet, others still consider the
Caucasus to be an aggravating problem that should be
suppressed rather than resolved. Whichever the approach, Russia is unlikely to give up the North Caucasus unless forced to by the aforementioned factors.
The nationalist movements that have conspicuously expressed their animosity toward the region have
pled to Putin to stop the government’s assistance to
governments in the Northern Caucasus at the expense
of Slavic/Orthodox Russians. In the last few years,
Russians have protested and rioted against the development aid to the Caucasus, as well as in response to
alleged and real attacks on ethnic Russians by Caucasian migrants in cities and villages all across Russia.
Locations included the village of Bezopasnoye (whose
name ironically means “safe”), in Stavropolskaya
Oblast’; Mirny, in Ulyanovsk oblast (which equally
ironically means “peaceful”), the cosmopolitan capitals of Moscow and Saint-Petersburg;204 Kondapoga
in the Karelia, Pugachev (Saratov oblast’);205 Nizhny
Novgorod; and Kirov, to mention just a few.
Most of society, even if not openly protesting,
holds peoples from the North Caucasus in low esteem,
refusing to see them as “Russians” and often limiting
them to low-skilled, menial jobs such as farmer market traders in the major cities. Yet, the demographic
dynamic suggests that the number of Russian citizens
with Muslim roots is growing, and they occupy increasingly important socio-economic positions. For
example, Rashid Nurgaliyev, who served as Russia’s
Interior Minister from 2003 to 2011, and Elvira Nabiullina, former Minister of Economic Development and
Trade and current Head of Russian Central Bank, as
well as many journalists, businesspeople, government
officials, and law enforcement personnel. Putin, having to struggle with economic, political, and social
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problems throughout all of Russia, cannot risk having the North Caucasus reappear as a national crisis
flashpoint, since it may lead to partial or even full loss
of government control over the country. The Kremlin,
therefore, has little choice but to continue its robust
anti-terrorist policies with auxiliary economic and
political support.
A favorable future in which the region prospers
and Islamism becomes less appealing looks increasingly unlikely today. The outlook of the North Caucasus is bleak, and the possible scenarios range from a
muddle through, more of the same/business as usual,
including low intensity conflict, to a disastrous outcome in which the Russian state is unable to control
the area, abandons the region, and Islamism takes a
central role.
U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS AND THE
NORTH CAUCASUS CHALLENGES
In order to secure the best outcome for the region,
the United States and its allies must continue to focus
their attention on the North Caucasus. The following
are the scenarios:
1. A significant improvement in socio-economic
and political dynamics if there is a drop in terrorist
recruitment and activity. This should decrease the
need for governmental counterterrorist operations
against the enemy and create a positive climate for
investment;
2. A status quo, as the region continues its reliance
on Moscow for subsidies, legitimacy, and support.
The status quo would also continue to stigmatize the
North Caucasus Muslims as citizens of lesser stature;
in short, a muddle through;
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3. Russian and local authorities’ failures to maintain the order in the region, and the North Caucasus
descends into chaos.
The status quo/muddle through remains the
most likely long-term outcome for the region, unless
Ramzan Kadyrov is killed or incapacitated; however,
maintaining the status quo only makes the crisis more
likely in the long term, since any significant economic
deterioration may bring patience and acquiescence
among the population to an end.
In light of the current situation, the United States
must act to protect its interests in the American homeland, as well as in Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle
East, and Central Asia. The United States must be
committed to curbing the growth of Islamist terrorism and radicalism in the North Caucasus. The United
States must engage its allies and work with Russia to
strengthen its border security, invigorate law enforcement, and counterterrorist cooperation with national
and international agencies, improve intelligence capabilities, and appeal for international cooperation to
eliminate the financial support of terrorism that helps
North-Caucasus militant groups flourish.
Without immediate, thorough, and concerted
international action, the challenges that the North
Caucasus presents to the world will grow into major
problems. As the terrorist threat grows in the North
Caucasus, the United States needs to improve the capabilities of the agencies most engaged in fighting it.
Specifically, the United States can work with Georgia
and Azerbaijan to improve their border security with
Russia. The inability to track and to stop those who
illegally cross the porous borders poses a great risk to
the energy infrastructure in the South Caucasus. En-
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gaging with Russia as well as American friends and
allies in the region to prevent infrastructure attacks,
as well as the smuggling of human beings, drugs
and arms, would greatly help to protect the region
from terrorism.
The United States may also help train and build
relationships with intelligence, counterterrorist, and
law enforcement agencies in South Caucasus, including Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. The United
States can explore expanded cooperation with other
foreign law enforcement and intelligence services for
the collection of, prevention, and disruption of terrorist operations, including against American and
friendly targets. U.S. intelligence and law enforcement
agencies would benefit from cultivating regional ties
and cooperating against such future threats as described in this monograph. Such cooperation will give
the United States a better understanding of the North
Caucasus threat from sources who know the languages, religions, cultures, history, and geography of
the region.
The United States also needs to strive to uncover
the North Caucasus terrorist networks that have connections to international terrorism. One effective way
for the United States to stop North Caucasus-based
terrorism is to hamper the means by which the groups
grow and operate in the region and beyond. For example, this means that the United States should encourage Middle Eastern states to stop the transfer of funds
to the North Caucasus extremists and cease their indoctrination and Salafi/Wahhabi education for global
terrorist cadres, including recruiters and propagandists from the North Caucasus.
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CONCLUSION
Over 2 centuries of abuses of the Russian imperial
policy in the North Caucasus resonate even today.
The North Caucasus has been a subject of the tsarist
expansionist policies, communist oppression, Stalin’s
cruelty, and post-Soviet Russia’s crippled and corrupt
institutions, which, while providing some modernization drivers, sewed inter-ethnic and inter-religious
discord and perpetuated the violent culture. The national reaction gave way to religious extremism. Russians did conquer the North Caucasus militarily, but
they failed to assimilate the local population, extirpate
the distinct identities of the North Caucasian peoples,
or find a modus vivendi with Islam. The Chechens, the
Ingush, the Circassians, and other local nations remember their tragic past and bear grudges against the
Russians. Even though the Winter Olympics in Sochi
in 2014 brought international attention to the tragedies of the region, fortunately, terrorist attacks never
materialized during the games.
After two devastating wars at the end of the 20th
century, Moscow has now largely rebuilt the destroyed Chechen infrastructure. On the surface, the
Chechen capital Grozny looks more prosperous than
ever. However, the Kremlin has failed to solve the
underlying problems that fuel Islamist extremism
and terrorism.
Improving the situation in the North Caucasus
would ultimately require tackling corruption and ensuring government accountability to the local population—something that is highly unlikely to happen
anytime soon. Soaring unemployment, unfair treatment of the North Caucasian ethnic minorities in Russia proper, the lack of opportunities, and a lack of be-
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lief in a better future motivate some of the Chechens,
Ingush, Dagestanis, etc., to join violent groups active
against the local governments and against Moscow—
and in the cause of the global “holy war” against the
“infidels.”
The North Caucasus still faces a precarious future,
as well as economic collapse and devastation. The
growth of radical Islam and the danger of global jihad impeding on the region imperil not only Russia,
but also the security of the U.S. homeland and allies.
What was a nationalist struggle against Moscow has
mutated over a short period of time into a global menace that already has spread to the Middle East, Central
Asia, Europe, and the United States. The United States
must track the threats from the North Caucasus and
strive to prevent their further integration with global
militant Islamist actors. Today, no American strategy against global Islamism will be effective without
detailed programs and plans to combat terrorist networks in the North Caucasus.
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